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STADIUM CONSTRUCTION FOR
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: REVERSING THE
INEQUITIES THROUGH TAX INCENTIVES
ZACHARY A. PHELPS*
INTRODUCTION
There are few things in today's society that garner more
attention or have a larger significance on everyday life than
sports. Avid fans follow their favorite teams not only during
their respective seasons, but search the Internet and sports page
in the off-season to find even the slightest bit of information.
Popular holidays are interwoven with various sporting events,
such as football on Thanksgiving Day or baseball on the Fourth
of July.1 Some events even attract their own celebration, such as
Super Bowl Sunday. If a city's local team is fortunate enough to
win a championship, a large-scale parade is usually held to honor
the players and coaches. 2 Clearly, sports permeate multiple
aspects of our lives, and it is this popularity that sports
franchises use to their advantage. People become so attached to
*J.D. Candidate, June 2004, St. John's University School of Law; B.S. Western
Kentucky University 2001.
1See MARK S. ROSENTRAUB, MAJOR LEAGUE LOSERS: THE REAL COST OF SPORTS AND
WHO'S PAYING FOR IT 47 (Basic Books 1999) (1997) (discussing ministers in Texas that try
to keep Sunday sermons short when the Dallas Cowboys have a game beginning at noon);
see also Lions Football and Thanksgiving: Thanksgiving Traditions In the Motor City
(2001-2003), Detroit Lions Official Site (noting the importance of football to the Michigan
Thanksgiving tradition), at http://www.detroitlions.com/document display.cfm?document
id=3615 (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). See generally Jeremy Twitchell, Turkey Bowl- A
Thanksgiving Tradition (Nov. 25, 2002) (discussing tradition of playing in football
tournaments on Thanksgiving morning), at http://nn.byu.edu/story.cfm/41072.
2 See Jack Curry, 3 in a Row? Easy as Tick-Tack-Toe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at D1
(describing ticker tape parade held for New York Yankees after winning World Series);
see also Mary Jo Melone, Setting Sail Against the Tide of Fans and the NFL, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 28, 2003, at 1B (describing Buccaneer victory parade as
"screaming fans dressed in red and pewter... marching the streets of Tampa"); Kevin
Modesti, Celebrating Southern California's World Champs, THE DAILY NEWS OF LOS
ANGELES, Oct. 30, 2002, at N1 (discussing success of first Angel's championship parade in
Los Angeles).
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a team that it becomes part of the identity of the city.3 It is this
attachment that team owners seize upon and use to pressure city
and state governments to expend public funds, and utilize federal
tax law loopholes to build state of the art multi-million dollar
stadiums. 4
This note will discuss the various aspects of building publicly
funded stadiums for professional sports teams and potential use
of federal tax laws to balance the inequities. Part I explores the
history of financing professional stadiums. Part II examines the
federal tax structure that allows stadium subsidization, and a
proposal for change. Part III analyzes a specific legislative
proposal to alter the market for professional stadiums. Part IV
discusses the sports industry's arguments for the use of public
funds to build stadiums. Part V examines various justifications
offered by city and state governments to subsidize stadium
projects. Part VI looks at recent developments in stadium
finance, specifically, alternatives to using public funds. Part VII
proposes reform of the Federal Tax Code to limit federal
subsidization and create incentives to use methods other than
public funding to raise capital.
I. HISTORY OF STADIUM FINANCE
The current trend of using public resources for professional
sports stadiums has not always been the norm.5 In the early
3 See Robert Taylor Bowling, Sports Aggravated: The Fan's Guide to the Franchise
Relocation Problem in Professional Sports, 28 STETSON L. REV. 645, 649 (1999) (discussing
importance of being a 'big league" city with a professional sports franchise); see also Poe
v. Hillsbourough County, 695 So. 2d 672, 678-79 (Fla. 1997) ('The Court finds that the
[Tampa Bay] Buccaneers instill civic pride and camaraderie into the community and that
Buccaneer games and other stadium events also serve a commendable public purpose by
enhancing the community image on a nationwide basis and providing recreation,
entertainment and cultural activities to its citizens."). See, e.g., Modesti, supra note 2, at
N2 (noting that Los Angeles Angels are "good for the city").
4 See Thomas A. Piraino, A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulation of Professional
Sports, 79 B.U. L. REV. 889, 912-13 (1999) (noting cities are played against each other for
sports franchises); see also Melone, supra note 2, at 1B (discussing Buccaneer owner's
threats to leave city with team if community did not give money to build new stadium).
See generally Peter Whoriskey, Sports Stadium Deals Cost U.S. Treasury Big Bucks, THE
UNION LEADER (MANCHESTER, N.H.), July 30, 2003, at B3 (explaining recent construction
of sports stadiums is costing U.S. Treasury more than $100 million annually because of
use of tax-exempt bonds).
5 See Brian Adams, Stadium Funding in Massachusetts: Has the Commonwealth
Found the Balance in Private vs. Public Spending?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 655, 662 (2002)
(noting prior to World War I, every major league baseball stadium was under privately
ownership); see also Raymond J. Keating, Sports Pork: The Costly Relationship Between
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days of professional sports, publicly financed stadiums were the
minority.6 The first professional stadium, the Baker Bowl in
Philadelphia, was privately constructed and financed in 1897.7
Fenway Park and Wrigley Field, two of the most famous sports
venues still in use today, were also privately financed.8 In fact,
prior to 1948, only four of 28 major stadiums were built with any
public funds. 9 The first stadium to be totally publicly financed
was the Los Angeles Coliseum in 1923.10 The Coliseum, which
was built in an unsuccessful attempt to obtain the Olympics, cost
Major League Sports and Government, Cato Institute, Cato Policy Analysis No. 339, Apr.
5, 1999, at 1 (stating $14.7 million dollars out of approximately $20 million spent on
major league ball-parks was government subsidized), available at http://www.cato.org
/pubs/pas/pa339.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004); Whoriskey, supra note 4, at B3 (observing
since 1990 at least "38 major league sports venues have been built or rebuilt using nearly
$7 billion in tax-exempt financing").
6 See Keating, supra note 5, at 3 (describing government sports subsidization as "a
fairly recent development"); see also Tim Chapin, Sports Facilities and Development: The
Political Economy of Sports Facility Location: An End of the Century Review and
Assessment, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 361, 369-70 (2002) (stating "team owners were usually
financing and building the new stadium themselves, they had a very direct interest in
keeping costs down while still sitting the facility in a location accessible to their core
market."). See generally STEPHEN A. RIESS, THE AMERICAN SPORTING EXPERIENCE: A
HISTORICAL ANTHOLOGY OF SPORTS IN AMERICA 271-87 (Leisure Press 1984) (2000)
(discussing high price buying and selling of professional baseball in Atlanta, Chicago and
New York in early 20th century as dominated by urban politics).
7 See Keating, supra note 5, at 11 (Table 1) (noting there were no governmental
contributions to this stadium); see also Bob Warrington, A Historical Sketch of Baker
Bowl, Philadelphia Athletics Historical Society (discussing the "meager financing" of
stadium leading to renting it for various city events), at http://philadelphiaathletics.org/hi
story/baker.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
8 See Andrew M. Zaretsky, Should Cities Pay for Sports Facilities?, THE REGIONAL
ECONOMIST, Apr. 2001 (stating, "Fenway Park, Ebbets Field, Wrigley Field, Yankee
Stadium, and the original Comiskey Park, were all privately financed and owned."),
available at http://www.stls.frb.org/ publications/re/2001[b/pages/lead-article.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2004); see also A History of Fenway Park, available at http://boston.redsox.
mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/bos/ ballpark/history.jsp (discussing the decision of John I. Taylor
to build a new park for the Red Sox).
9 See Keating, supra note 5, at 11-12 (showing a chart identifying amount of public
funding each stadium received, listing the Los Angeles Coliseum, Soldier Field (Chicago),
Municipal Stadium (Cleveland), and War Memorial Stadium (Buffalo) as only four
stadiums without any direct public support); see also Andrew H. Goodman, The Public
Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums: Policy and Practice, 9 Sports Law. J. 173, 180
(2002) (noting that government subsidies prior to 1950 did not raise much criticism
because it was not yet common practice). See generally Chapin, supra note 6, at 376
(discussing increased influence of public sector on financing of sports facilities compared
since 1950).
10 See Keating, supra note 5, at 4 (noting Los Angeles Coliseum as first government
'large-scale stadium"); see also Adams, supra note 5, at 662 (discussing purpose of
stadium). See generally BENJAMIN G. RADER, AMERICAN SPORTS: FROM THE AGE OF FOLK
GAMES TO THE AGE OF SPECTATORS 233-34 (Prentice Hall 1983) (discussing promoters of
1932 Olympic Games in Los Angeles as "establishing a pattern of expensive and ornate
facilities that would become characteristic of all the modern games.").
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taxpayers just under one million dollars.11 However, during this
time period the publicly-funded Los Angeles Coliseum was still in
the minority. Public funding did not become the norm until the
early 1950's, when stadium construction began to increase
dramatically.12 From 1953 to 1970, 30 stadiums were built,
creating an average of almost two per year. 13 In contrast, before
1953 only 28 professional sports stadiums total had been
constructed. 14 Of the 30 stadiums constructed between 1953 and
1970, 27 received financial support from taxpayers.15 This
taxpayer support totaled over $450 million, nearly 70% of the
total cost of all 30 stadiums constructed during this time
period.16 As detailed, the use of public funds became the popular
mechanism to finance these projects.
11 See Keating, supra note 5, at 4 (stating original purpose of the Coliseum was to
secure the 1924 Olympics, at a cost of $954,873); see also RADER, supra note 10, at 242
(noting in a referendum voters of California approved use of 1 million dollars in state
funds). See generally Chapin, supra note 6, at 369 (stating location for Coliseum was
chosen because land was already leased by the city, had nearby trolley lines, and was
centrally located in region).
12 See Brett Smith, If You Build It, Will They Come? The Relationship Between Public
Financing of Sports Facilities and Quality of Life in America's Cities, 7 GEO. PUBLIC POL'Y
REV. 45, 46 (2001) (noting start of public financing in 1950's with change in relationship
between sports and government); see also Goodman, supra note 9, at 181 (stating despite
increased public funding of stadium construction, level of government involvement did not
raise much concern). See generally RADER, supra note 10, at 242 (noting in 1950 only
forty-two major league franchises existed in all of professional sports, which increased to
101 by 1980).
13 See Keating supra note 5, at 12. Only considering new constructions, not
renovations, 30 stadiums were constructed within a 17-year period beginning in 1953. Id.
The 1960's began a "new era" of stadium construction, which included replacing earlier
built private venues with publicly financed venues. See Goodman, supra note 9, at 181.
Between 1960 and 1975, an estimated 1 billion dollars worth of municipally supported
arenas were built. Consider the Coloseums, FORBES, Feb. 15, 1975, at 26.
14 See Keating supra note 5, at 11-12 (showing table listing stadium constructions
during that time period); see also Chapin, supra note 6, at 369 (stating "[olnly a handful of
new facilities came online between 1925 and 1950."). See generally Goodman, supra note
9, at 181 (noting the comparative cost of stadiums between 1909 and 1915 at around
500,000 and at 5.5 million dollars in 1965).
15 See Keating supra note 5, at 12. Only Colt Stadium, The Great Western Forum, and
Madison Square Garden did not receive any public money. Id. Interestingly, the tax
advantages that owners receive, including municipal subsidies for the construction of
stadiums, occur without the franchises being required to provide full financial
information demonstrating the need for the money. RICHARD G. SHEEHAN, KEEPING
SCORE: THE ECONOMICS OF BIG-TIME SPORTS 327 (Diamond Communications, Inc. 1996).
The benefits reaped by the supporting cities are quite questionable. See generally
ROSENTRAUB, supra note 1, at 148-51. For example, although increased restaurant and
hotel patronage may experience a growth in spending, this does not necessarily mean a
large benefit to the economy. Id. at 149.
16 See Keating, supra note 5, at 12 (noting cost of all stadiums between 1953 and 1970
totaled $672,059,000, of which $463,059,000 was paid by public funding, equaling 68.9%
of cost); see also Consider the Colloseum, supra note 13, at 26 (explaining justifications for
such high financing is often that stadium is a community asset, despite taxpayers being
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The large increase in construction, beginning in the early
1950's, was due to the popularity of sports, its growing audience,
and additional teams being fielded.17 During the 1950's the
population was moving away from the industrial cities.18 As the
country grew, new and upcoming cities wanted to compete with
the more established cities of the east coast. 19 One avenue of
competition, and a status symbol of a major metropolis, was a
professional sports team.20 To lure these teams away from their
eastern roots, the new cities had to create incentives to leave
their loyal fan bases. 21 The most popular and effective incentive
was the publicly funded stadium.
left covering heavy debt and operating deficits after construction). See generally
Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National Football
League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 486 (1997) (noting examples of extravagant public
financing in recent NFL history).
17 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 181 (stating during this time period, professional
football was gaining popularity, increasing demand for stadiums); see also Smith, supra
note 12, at 47 (discussing factors considered when determining whether to build facility,
including economic impact on residents and job creation). See generally RADER, supra note
10, at 197 (discussing "ascendancy of the spectator" was due to an expanded market for
all forms of entertainment).
18 See MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, HOME TEAM: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND THE
AMERICAN METROPOLIS 25 (Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (noting declining population in
mid-western and eastern baseball towns, and emerging population in the west); see also
ROSENTRAUB, supra note 1, at 216 (discussing St. Louis's drastic decline in population
from 1960 through 1990 and subsequent loss of professional teams). See generally RADER,
supra note 10, at 242 (discussing spread of big-league franchises to "every section of the
nation").
19 See DANIELSON, supra note 18, at 25 (discussing shifting population to the West
Coast and the need of sports to follow its fan base); Chapin, supra note 6, at 363
(concluding that sports franchises follow the middle-class fan base, which in the 1950's
was expanding away from major metropolitan cities). See generally Adam Safir, If You
Build It, They Will Come: The Politics of Financing Sports Stadium Construction, 13 J. L.
& POLITICS 937, 937-55 (conducting case studies of why sports teams move to different
cities).
20 See Keith Negrin, If You Build It, They Might Stay: Unconscionability in Modern
Sports Stadium Leases, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 503, 523 (2001) (listing justifications for public
expenditures as the desire to be a "big league city" or "keeping up with the Joneses"). See
generally Dean V. Baim, The Rational Behavior Behind NFL Relocations, 30 U. TOL. L.
REV. 443, 443 (1999) (noting that several cities have engaged in bidding wars in order to
retain an NFL franchise); Smith, supra note 12, at 48-50 (debunking stated justifications
for new stadiums, namely that they improve the quality of life of poor cities, as foolhardy).
21 See generally Jessica Smith, Speaker: Stadiums Offer Little to Cities (stating
economic views on whether publicly funded stadiums actually benefit the public), at
http://www.theshorthorn.coml archive/2003/spring/03-apr- 17/n041703-05.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2004); National Center for Policy Analysis, More Publicly Funded
Stadiums (listing forms of public funding for stadiums), at
http://www.ncpa.org/pd/state/sbjun97a.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004); Greens Blast D.C.
Mayor Williams' Taxpayer-Funded Ballpark Boondoggle, Green Party of the United
States (stating objections to public funding of stadiums by the Green Party), at
http://www.gp.org/press/states/dc0611O3.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
986 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:3
One of the most famous exits actually involves two teams. In
1957 New York began the year with three professional baseball
teams.22 After the season one remained.23 The Brooklyn
Dodgers left for Los Angeles, and San Francisco lured away the
New York Giants.24 The Dodgers worked out a deal with Los
Angeles where they traded a minor league stadium for a much
more valuable piece of real estate. 25 The city also paid over $4
million for construction preparation of the site and road
improvements. 26 The Giants fared even better in the new
California market. They received the promise of a brand new
stadium.27 In 1960, at a cost of $32 million to taxpayers,
Candlestick Park opened as the new home of the Giants. 28 This
22 See Franchise Facts At-A-Glance: San Francisco Giants, Baseball-almanac.com,
(listing last year in New York as 1957), at http://baseball-almanac.com/teams/giants.shtml
(last visited Feb. 3, 2004); Franchise Facts At-A-Glance: Los Angeles Dodgers, Baseball-
almanac.con, (listing last year in New York as 1957) at http://baseballalmanac.com
teams/dodgers.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
23 See Robert M. Jarvis, Book Review, When the Lawyers Slept: The Unmaking of the
Brooklyn Dodgers, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 347, 348 (1989) (discussing the effects and causes
of the Dodgers move in 1957). See generally Franchise Facts At-A-Glance: San Francisco
Giants, supra note 22 (noting that the Giants left New York following the 1957 season);
Franchise Facts At-A-Glance: Los Angeles Dodgers, supra note 22 (noting that the Dodgers
left New York following the 1957 season).
24 See Bowling, supra note 3, at 649 (noting the loss of 2 major league baseball
franchises for the City of New York); see also Scott R. Rosner, The History and Business of
Contraction in Major League Baseball, 8 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 265, 269 n.35 (2003)
(stating that the Giants move occurred in 1958); Franchise Facts At-A-Glance: San
Francisco Giants, supra note 22 (stating that Giants move occurred in 1958).
25 See Keating, supra note 5, at 5 (stating, "[t]he Dodgers traded their minor league
Wrigley Field to the city in exchange for a far more valuable 300 acres in Chavez Ravine
in the Los Angeles Basin."); see also Peter Sepulveda, The Use of Eminent Domain Power
in the Relocation of Sports Stadiums to Urban Areas: Is the Public Purpose Requirement
Satisfied?, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 137, 139 (2001) (noting how Dodgers were given
300 acres of land for their stadium in Los Angeles). See generally Lisa-Michele Smith,
History, Rivalry, Envy, and Relocation: Will the Sale of the New York Jets Give Rise to a
New Stadium?, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 309, 335 (2000) (stating that relocation arguably had no
economic effect on either New York or Los Angeles).
26 See Keating, supra note 5, at 5 (referring to the City of Los Angeles's contribution to
the Dodgers stadium, "The city spent $2 million to grade Chaves Ravine, and the county
spent $2.74 million for road improvements.").
27 See Keating, supra note 5, at 4-5 (discussing promise of a stadium able to seat
nearly 50,000 people which led Giants to move before the stadium was constructed). See
generally Candlestick Park, a.k.a. 3Com Park, Baseball-statistics.com (noting that
stadium capacity ranged from 42,000 to 62,000 for the years Candlestick Park was in
use), at http://www.baseballstatistics.com/Ballparks /SF/Candlestick.htm (last visited
Feb. 3, 2004); 1960: Christening a New Stadium, San Francisco Giants Official Site
(detailing the history of that new stadium), at http://sanfrancisco.giants.mlb.com
INASApp/mlb/sfhistory/sf-history-.timeline article.jsp?article=24 (last visited Feb. 3,
2004).
28 See Keating, supra note 5, at 5 (noting the costs of Candlestick Park). See generally
Glenn Dickey, The Stadium Realities Giants Must Face, SAN. FRAN. CHRON., June 12,
1992, at C3 (noting that good fortune of Giants has not lasted, they are now looking to
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mass exodus from New York, known for its loyal fans, was the
real beginning of the current competitive atmosphere. 29 It is this
atmosphere that has led so many cities to spend large amounts of
public funds to attract a professional franchise. 30
II. USING THE FEDERAL TAX CODE TO FINANCE A STADIUM
A. Basic Tax Framework
All stadium construction begins with a financing plan. A key
component to many stadium-financing plans is the use of the tax
code. 31 Indirectly, the code is used to provide a subsidy, but to
qualify the bond issuer has to meet certain requirements. 32
These requirements pressure cities and states to take on more of
the debt and promote economically unsound practices.
Internal Revenue Code § 103(a) excludes from a bondholder's
gross income any interest earned on a municipal bond.33 This
move or build a new stadium); Candlestick Park, a.k.a. 3Com Park, supra note 27
(detailing history, and indeed baseball players' hatred of, this stadium).
29 See William B. Gould, Baseball and Globalization: The Game Played and Heard and
Watched 'Round the World (With Apologies to Soccer and Bobby Thomson), 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 85, 87 (2000) (noting how relocation of Brooklyn Dodgers and New
York Giants "set the stage" for baseball expansion). See generally David P. Fidler,
Baseball in the Global Era: Economic, Legal, and Cultural Perspectives, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEG. STUD. 1, 1-8 (2000) (noting that current trend in baseball is globalization); Leonard
Koppet, The Globalization of Baseball, Reflections of a Sports Writer, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEG. STUD. 81, 81-82 (2000) (discussing trend of globalization and ultimately rejecting for
baseball).
30 See Andrew Gasper, Senator Moynihan's Field of Dreams: If You Build It, They Will
Come.. .But Not at the Federal Taxpayers' Expense, 17 VA. TAX REV. 341, 343 (1997)
(noting over $9 billion will be spent on stadiums and $4 out of every $5 will be from public
funds). See generally Erik Brady, Some Legislators Say Baltimore's Money Misspent, USA
TODAY, Sept. 6, 1996, at 19C (detailing how funds were received for the stadium); Erik
Brady and Debbie Howlett, Ballpark Construction's Booming Cost to Hit $9 Billion by
Decade's End, But Who's Paying For It?, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1996, at 13C (analyzing
costs to the public for stadiums).
31 See Gasper, supra note 30, at 350-51 (noting applicable Internal Revenue Codes);
Goodman, supra note 9, at 180-83 (noting state and federal tax exceptions that are
granted to sports stadiums); Matthew J. Parlow, Publicly Financed Sports Facilities: Are
They Economically Justifiable? A Case Study of the Los Angeles Staples Center, 10 U.
MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 483, 497-502 (2002) (noting tax provisions that apply).
32 See I.R.C. § 103 (2002) (detailing the requirements for tax code). See generally
Gasper, supra note 30, at 351 (discussing the relevant provisions of the code); Goodman,
supra note 9, at 216 (2002) (stating in past much of proposed legislation was designed to
fill the current loopholes in tax code, which essentially subsidize stadium construction).
33 See I.R.C. § 103(a) (2002) (stating this interest is tax free); see also David S. Miller,
Distinguishing Risk: The Disparate Tax Treatment Of Insurance And Financial Contracts
In A Converging Marketplace, 55 TAX LAW. 481, 492 n.26 (2002) (noting that under §
103(a) of code, interest earned on bond is excluded from gross income for bondholder);
Carl Ullman, New Players In The Public Borrowing Game: Tax And Sovereignty
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incentive for individuals to invest in municipal bonds was created
to help local governments raise capital. 34 A city can easily raise
capital because it can offer the bonds at a lower interest rate
than the private market due to the advantageous tax treatment
of the interest to bondholders. 35
One type of bond specifically excluded from § 103(a), thereby
making the interest taxable income, is a "private activity
bond."36 Private activity bonds are defined in § 141 as any type
of bond that meets two specific tests.37 The first test is the
"private business use test," which is met if, "more than 10% of
the proceeds of the issue are to be used for any private business
use."38 Private business use is defined in § 141(b)(6) as "use
(directly or indirectly) in a trade or business carried on by any
person other than a governmental unit."39 In the context of a
stadium this test will always be met because private sports
teams are the primary users of the facility.40 The second, and
Considerations As Freely Associated States And Indian Tribes Approach Wall Street, 11 U.
HAW. L. REV. 111, 118 n.49 (1989) (stating § 103(a) excludes a bondholder's interest from
gross income).
34 See Fox v. United States, 397 F.2d 119, 122 (8th Cir. 1968) (stating that legislative
history of § 103 "clearly indicates" its purpose was to lower the cost of capital to local
governments); American Viscose Corp. v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 1033, 1034 (3d Cir. 1932)
(reiterating Congress' reasons for creating tax-exempt bonds).
35 See U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. Anderson, 65 F.2d 575, 578 (2d Cir. 1933)
(stating, "state and municipal bonds and securities issued to borrow money, if tax exempt,
will command a better price in the market than if they are subject to taxation"); American
Viscose Corp., 56 F.2d at 1034 (noting advantages of creating tax-exempt bonds); see also
Joseph L. Bast, Sports Stadium Madness: Why it Started-How To Stop It, Heartland
Institute Report No. 85, Feb. 23, 1998, at 4 (estimating tax-exempt bonds pay a 2% to
4.5% lower rate of interest than private bonds and other types of loans available in the
marketplace), available at http://www.heartland.org/Article.cfm?artId=9474.
36 I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) (2002) (excluding any private activity bond which is not qualified
under § 141).
37 I.R.C. § 141(a)(1) (2003) (listing both tests and requiring each to be met to be
classified as a private activity bond); see also William H. Baker, Taxation and Professional
Sports - A Look Inside the Huddle, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 287, 300 (1999) (defining private
activity bonds); Daniel J. Lathrope, Federal Tax Policy, Tax Subsidies, and the Financing
of Professional Sports Facilities, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1997) (stating private
activity bond as one that satisfies private use test and private security test).
38 I.R.C. § 141(a)(1)(A) (2003) (listing private business use test); I.R.C. § 141(b)(1)
(2003) (defining private business use test); see also James L. Musselmann, Recent Federal
Income Tax Issues Regarding Professional and Amateur Sports, 13 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
195, 198 (2003) (noting private business use test); Kevin M. Yamamoto, A Proposal for the
Elimination of the Exclusion for State Bond Interest, 50 FLA. L. REV. 145, 159 (1998)
(explaining private business use test requires more than 10 percent of proceeds to be used
for any private purpose).
39 I.R.C. § 141(b)(6) (2003).
40 See Baker, supra note 37, at 301 (noting difficulty of getting around business use
test in the context of a stadium); Goodman, supra note 9, at 183 (2002) (discussing the
importance of the "security test" because private business use test is always met by a
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more important test for a private activity bond is the "private
security test."41 To meet the private security test, more than
10% of a bond issue must directly or indirectly be secured by an
interest in property that will be used for a private business.42 If
both of these tests are met a bond is classified as a private
activity bond. Generally, once the private activity classification
attaches, a bond issue cannot obtain tax-exempt status.43
However, a private activity bond can fall back into tax-exempt
status if it is a "qualified private activity bond" under § 141(e). 44
If the bonds are qualified, the interest to the bondholder is
excludable even though it is a private activity bond.45 The main
drawback of being classified as a qualified private activity bond,
instead of a normal municipal bond, is that the bond issuer is
subject to a cap. 46 The cap is imposed by § 146, which limits the
amount of qualified private activity bonds that can be issued.47
The cap, determined by using state population, requires the
sports franchise); Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1156-57 (explaining use of stadium by
professional sports team will usually be greater than 10% limit and private security test
must be avoided to finance with tax-exempt bonds).
41 See Anoop K. Bhasin, Tax -Exempt Bond Financing of Sports Stadiums: Is the Price
Right?, 7 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 187 (2000) (explaining nature of conjunctive test
requires one "prong" to be satisfied); see also Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1156-57 (stating
since stadium will satisfy private use test, focus is on avoiding private security test);
Musselmann, supra note 38, at 198 (noting private security test is "critical" test).
42 I.R.C. § 141(a)(1)(B) (2003) (listing private security or payment test); see Baker,
supra note 37, at 301 (explaining private security test); Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1156-
57 (describing private security test).
43 See Bhasin, supra note 41, at 186 (explaining bond that does not fit requirements of
a qualified private activity bond will not be tax-exempt); see also Lathrope, supra note 37,
at 1156-57 (noting that the 10% threshold includes both principal and interest secured by
the facility, in addition to revenue generated by rents); Catherine Michael, Brother, Can
You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment Financing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457, 461 (1996)
(stating nonprivate activity bonds are automatically tax exempt).
44 I.R.C. § 141(e) (2003) (defining qualified bond and listing examples); see Michael,
supra note 43, at 461 (explaining private activity bond is classified as tax exempt if it is
qualified bond); Yamanoto, supra note 38, at 160 (noting when private activity bonds are
qualified private activity bonds).
45 See Bhasin supra note 41, at 186 (noting qualified private activity bond meets
Code's criteria to be qualified facility); see also Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1156 (stating
criteria required to be qualified bond); Michael, supra note 43, at 461 (explaining when
qualified bonds will be tax-exempt).
46 See I.R.C. § 146 (2003) (stating volume cap guidelines); see also Baker, supra note
37, at 300 (stating qualified private activity bonds are subject to cap and interest beyond
limit is taxable); Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1156 (noting qualified bonds must satisfy
volume cap).
47 See I.R.C. § 146 (2003) (delineating volume cap guidelines); see also Lathrope, supra
note 37, at 1156 (defining cap as limiting total amount of qualified bonds that state may
issue); Yamamoto, supra note 38, at 159-60 (explaining classification of qualified bond
depends on the manner in which it will be used).
990 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:3
particular bond issuer to make a choice.48 Among the various
qualified uses in § 141(e), a government must choose which types
of projects will get tax-exempt status 49
It is helpful to remember that teams and local governments
want to fail one of the two private activity tests. In doing so, the
bonds received by the bondholder are not classified as private
activity bonds, which in turn will exclude the bond interest from
gross income under § 103(a).50 Because the private business use
test is normally met, the private security test is the main
focus. 51 A closer look at the security test shows that to build a
stadium, the stadium itself cannot be used to secure the bond
debt.52 Any revenue from a stadium cannot be used to finance
more than 10% of the debt, meaning that a city or state must
secure 90%.53 By placing a limitation on stadium revenue that
48 See I.R.C. § 146(c) (stating cap is calculated according to a state's population; see
also Baker, supra note 37, at 300 (discussing limit imposed by cap); Lathrope, supra note
37, at 1156 (noting state is limited to certain number of qualified bonds).
49 See I.R.C. § 141(e) (listing various qualified private activity bonds); see also Baker,
supra note 37, at 300 (stating qualified bonds include various types of activity bonds, not
including athletic facilities); Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1156 (commenting that qualified
bonds may not be used to finance facilities).
50 I.R.C. § 103(a) (2002) (explaining interest from state or local bonds are not gross
income); see also Baker, supra note 37, at 300 (stating § 103 of the I.R.C. allows bonds to
produce tax free interest); Musselmann supra note 38, at 196-197 (explaining § 103 of the
code excludes the interest paid on bonds).
51 See John R. Dorocak, Tax Advantages of Sports Franchises: Part I-The Stadium,
1999 L. REV. OF MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 579, 584-85, (1999) (explaining that a government
will try to "flunk" the security test because business use test is always met in stadium
context); see also Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1156-57 (stating private security test must
be avoided in order to finance facility with tax-exempt bonds); Musselmann, supra note
38, at 198 (noting private security test is more important because private business test
will normally be met when financing professional sports facility).
52 See Bhasin, supra note 41, at 187-88 (noting this requirement forces a city to look
for outside sources of revenue to repay 90% of the bond issue); see also Musselmann,
supra note 38, at 198-99 (explaining state or local governments constructing a
professional sports facility need to locate source of revenue "other than the facility itself,
the revenue from such facility, or the team using or operating the facility" to pay at least
90% on principal and interest payments of bonds); Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1157
(stating city or state constructing a sports facility is required to find another revenue
source to pay at least 90% of principal and interest on facility's financing).
53 See DENNIS ZIMMERMAN, TAX-EXEMPT BONDS AND THE ECONOMICS OF
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS STADIUMS, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP. 96-460E (May 29, 1996)
(explaining 1986 tax reforms caused problems with financing professional sports
stadiums); see also Parlow, supra note 31, at 499 (noting how cities are "forced" to secure
the bond issue); Musselmann, supra note 38, at 198 (explaining governments need to set
reasonable rental terms to professional sports team to comply with statutory
requirements).
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can be used to pay off the bond debt at 10%, additional sources of
income are necessary. 54
Several cities have levied taxes on alcohol or cigarettes, known
as sin taxes, as an alternative form of revenue. 55 Other cities
have used hotel taxes56 or rental car taxes,5 7 which place the
burden of financing the stadium on travelers that will probably
never see a game there. This is troubling because not only are
non-resident's taxed for something from which they will never
benefit, but they have no representation in the local legislature to
represent their interests before the tax is imposed.58 This
burden shifting approach allows local politicians to display the
stadium as their accomplishment while not having to raise taxes
on his or her constituents.59
54 See Baker, supra note 37, at 301 (using Cleveland Browns as example of
government sidestepping private activity bond rule); see also Lathrope, supra note 37, at
1157 (stating 10% essentially compels a publicly financed sports stadium to offer the host
team beneficial rental terms). See generally Parlow, supra note 31, at 498 (explaining that
to make sports facilities profitable, governments need to satisfy 10% threshold).
55 See Kerry M. Fraas, Bankers Up!" Professional Sports Facility Financing and Other
Opportunities for Ban Involvement in Lucrative Professional Sports, 3 N.C. BANKING INST.
201, 212 (1999) (discussing use of a sin tax on alcohol and cigarettes in Cleveland to
support Jacobs Field); Scott A. Jensen, Financing Professional Sports Facilities With
Federal Tax Subsidies: Is it Sound Tax Policy? 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 425, 430-31 (2000);
see also Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Public Finance of Sports Stadia: Controversial But
Permissible... Time For Federal Income Tax Relief for State and Local Taxpayers, 1 VA.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 135, 157 (2002) (discussing use of sin taxes on cigarettes to pay for
stadiums and much more useful alternatives, such as health care for smokers or anti-
smoking programs).
56 See Margaret Gillerman, Ex-Mayors' Terms Ended, But Urge To Help Lingers, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 23, 2003, at 5 (discussing a board of ex-mayors proposing
legislation for city of St. Louis, including a "hotel tax to support a new stadium and
convention center"); Fran Spielman, Hotel Tax Could Help Soldier Field, CHICAGO-SUN
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2000 (discussing hotel taxes); Sarah Talaylay, Time Right To Talk
Stadium, SUN-SENTINEL (FORT LAUDERDALE, FL), Oct. 26, 2002, at 8C (noting creation of
a hotel tax as an option for financing a public stadium).
57 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 495 (noting a 2% increase in the renal car tax for
Kings County, Washington to pay for Safeco Field in Seattle); see also Pat Flannery, Deal
Moves Up Cards Stadium Work; Price Guarantees To Be Phased In Over Few Months,
ARIz. REPUBLIC, May 15, 2003, at 3B (discussing financing plans for a new Arizona
Cardinals stadium, for which rental car and hotel-bed taxes are expected to produce
$252.3 million); Terry Stutz, Stadium Bill Goes To Perry, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 9,
2003, at 3A (discussing a bill "authorizing higher hotel and rental car taxes in Dallas
County to finance a new stadium for the Dallas Cowboys").
58 See generally Todd Senkiewicz, Stadium and Arena Financing: Who Should Pay? 8
SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 575, 587 (1998) (arguing that such taxes on out-of-staters,
although attractive to state citizens, may actually be a detriment to the state economy
because the higher cost of lodging in the state may deter tourists who would otherwise
bring revenue to the state); Alan Snel, Experts: Stadium Tax Not Fair, Alternative
Funding Methods Urged, DENVER POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at B1 (noting deterrent effect of
high hotel taxes on visitors from out of state).
59 See Linda Grant Williams, Changing Game of Sports Finance, in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 1999, at 841, 846 (PLI Commercial Laws and Practice
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Some have opted not to tax visitors, but rather tax everyone in
a given community. In Milwaukee, for example, a five county
sales tax was imposed to acquire the needed revenue. 60 This
approach will place the burden on the entire community,
including those who will never attend a game. This seems to be
more equitable than taxing non-residents, but there are still
innocent taxpayers who never receive any benefit from their
direct subsidy of the stadium.61
Whatever the additional source of revenue, the burden falls on
the community, and in some instances, people who derive little, if
any, benefit from the stadium. These drastic and somewhat
unfair measures are undertaken merely to keep the bond interest
tax-free. 62 If a city can maneuver around the private activity
bond status, they can build for a lower cost. 63 Various experts in
the field have estimated the benefits of keeping a bond issue tax-
free. Some believe it can add an additional 34% to the cost of
Course, Handbook Series No. A0-0033 (1999) (explaining how it is more popular to tax
visitors than residents); see also Snel, supra note 58, at B1 (criticizing hotel taxes as a
means of justifying use of public funds for private use). But see John Dougherty, BOB's a
Bust, PHOENiX NEW TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at Features (discussing a Phoenix stadium tax
plan shifting financing burden to tourists but also seeking to "offset the expected negative
impact on tourism" by using a percentage of the tax dollars collected to promote tourism).
60 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 186 (discussing the financing plan for Miller Park
which consisted of $160 million tax-exempt bonds financed by a 0.1% increase in the
regional sales tax, $40 million from the franchise, and a $50 million loan from the state);
Parlow, supra note 31, at 499 (discussing the regional sales tax imposed on the five
surrounding counties to pay for the tax-exempt bond debt used to construct Miller Park).
See generally State Senator Awaits Outcome Of Recall Vote, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 22,
2003, at 18 (stating voters recalled Sen. George Petak of Racine in 1996 "after he cast the
deciding vote for a regional sales tax to pay for the Miller Park baseball stadium").
61 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 187 (noting that a large majority of taxpayers will
never even enter the stadium they have paid for); see also Snel, supra note 58, at B1
(noting the attractiveness of shifting financial burden to tourism in seeking funding for a
privately-owned stadium). See generally Garth Woolsey, Lessons Learned At Public
Trough, TORONTO STAR, July 22, 2003, at E08 (reflecting resistance to spending taxpayer
funds on stadiums instead of other public programs where billion-dollar corporations will
benefit the most from the stadiums).
62 See A Grenade With Seams, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 26, 2003, at C6
(discussing possible change in IRS rules for currently tax-free government-issued bonds,
which may change since bondholders may reap too high a return on investment); see also
Amy Feldman, The Tax of Unintended Consequences, MONEY, Sept. 2003, at 86 (stating
"true [municipal bonds] remain tax-exempt, but private-activity bonds--those issued by a
state or locality to fund private activities, such as building a sports stadium--do not").
63 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 10; (noting the lower cost when debt is issued
tax-free because the bonds can be issued at a lower interest rate); see also Double Play:
The Economics and Financing of Stadiums for the Yankees and Mets, Independent Budget
Office: City of New York [hereinafter IBO Report] (noting the sharp cost increases if
municipal bonds are not used), at http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us /iboreports/doubleplay.html
(last visited, Feb. 3, 2004); Feldman, supra note 62, at 86 (noting that municipal debt
funds only qualify for tax exemption if their "maximum investment in private-activity
bonds is capped at 20%.").
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construction to a stadium,64 while more conservative views are
15-20%.65 These estimates show how some stadium construction
projects could possibly hinge on the classification of the bonds as
private activity bonds.66 These cost figures also reveal why a city
will go to great lengths and adopt economically irrational policies
to fail one of the private activity bond tests.
Once a bond issue fails either the private business use or the
private security test, the bond interest is tax-free to the
holder. 67 Tax-free interest is lost revenue to the federal
government. 68 If that same bondholder invested in a private
bond or some other type of taxable income producing security, the
64 See IBO Report, supra note 51 (stating 'This financing alternative has a
disadvantage relative to tax-exempt debt because the loss of the federal tax exemption on
the bonds issued can add up to 34 percent to the total cost of the bonds."); see also
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 10 (explaining the cost of a project can go up if tax-exempt
status is lost, but the amount of increase depends on the bond market and differential
between the market rate and the rate for tax-exempt municipal bonds). See generally
Ashlea Ebeling, When Tax-Exempts Aren't, FORBES, Apr. 1, 2002, at 79 (noting the
possible downside to overuse of so-called "tax exempt" private activity bonds).
65 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 10 (estimating some project's cost would only
increase by 17% in a market where interest rates are low); see also Stephen Koff, Mayor,
Council Deep in NFL Talks, THE PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), Mar. 7, 1996, at 1A
(discussing possible jump in Cleveland stadium taxes to $4.4 million annually if it were to
lose its tax-exempt status); Irwin M. Stelzer, Let the Owners Pay, N.Y. POST, Aug. 29,
1996 (claiming an increase in cost of 15% to 20% for stadiums if tax-exempt bond status
was lost and noting that for some projects this could add $30 million to $40 million to the
cost of a stadium).
66 See Andrea Figler, Cowboy Deal in Trouble?, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 11, 1999, at 1
(discussing difficulty in luring investors to a $120 million bond offering to finance an
entertainment complex where the bonds may not qualify for tax-exempt status); see also
Mike Allen, Ballpark Building Stoppage Imminent, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at
1 (stating, "Without the tax-free bond funding, the $ 450 million ballpark that has been
under construction since late May will come to a halt next Monday."). See generally Tax
Overtures Play On Municipal Bonds, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 22, 1986, at 19 (noting that
private activity bonds remain attractive with low coupon rates only because of their tax
exempt status).
67 See Susanna Duff Barnett, Regulation: Lack of Response Forces the IRS To Cancel
Private-Activity Hearing, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 24, 2003, at 5 (discussing current tax
rules regarding private-business use bond tax exemption); Feldman, supra note 62, at 86
(warning investors to be wary of the municipal bond investment in private activity, since
the debt can lose its tax-exempt status if more than 20% invested in private activity). See
generally Karen Pierog, Michigan Bill Signed To Let Six Counties Offer Tax Package To
Fund Stadiums, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 30, 1991, at 1 (discussing a deal structured
specifically around the "private use" test in order to gain tax-exempt status).
68 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 497 (stating, "the present value of a federal revenue
loss on $225 million worth of tax-exempt bonds is between $47 million and $94 million,
depending on the interest rate differential."); Yamamoto, supra note 38, at 153-54 (noting
the direct federal subsidy to the state because of the foregone revenue that would have
been collected by the federal government). See generally Briefs - Sports, SOUTH BEND
TRIB., Mar. 28, 2001, at B4 (discussing IRS investigation of bond issue for stadium
originally deemed tax exempt which could result in bond purchasers or the city of
Nashville having to pay back taxes).
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government would receive taxes. 69 The federal government is
foregoing money to benefit these stadium construction projects,
which is equivalent to a cash payment.70 Obviously the federal
government has more pressing issues on its agenda than making
sure all of the professional sports teams have new stadiums to
play in. This money could be used to fund any number of cash-
deprived programs that would benefit more people than a few
select franchise owners. 71 Even if one agrees with this federal
subsidization on the first cycle, some have argued that it will also
create a second subsidy.72 The second subsidy arises when cities
stop spending for other vital programs, and instead seek federal
funds for these programs. 73 Not only is the government
subsidizing the bonds themselves, they are also paying for the
programs that a city would be funding if it had not undertaken a
stadium construction.74
69 See Yamamoto, supra note 38, at 153-54 (explaining how a state gains the benefit of
tax-exempt status because they do not have to pay the extra percentage due to the bonds
effect on the bondholders taxable income.) For example, if a taxpayer purchases a $1000
taxable bond with a 10% interest rate and has a 40% marginal tax rate, there will be $60
profit after taxes. If a state sells the same person a bond with an interest rate of 6%, the
taxpayer would have $60 of taxable income. See Whoriskey, supra note 4, at B3. See
generally Bhasin, supra note 41, at 195-98 (discussing proposed legislation for federal
bond taxes).
70 Goodman, supra note 9, at 182 (discussing how taxpayers are "slighted" because no
revenue is collected when these bonds are issued); Peter Whoriskey, Stadiums Are Built
On Federal Tax Break, WASH. POST, July 28, 2003, at A01 (noting that federal tax
exemption for stadium projects costs the US Treasury millions of dollars in lost tax
revenues every year); Feldman, supra note 62, at 86 (mentioning direct costs to the US
Treasury, and eventually federal taxpayers, as a result of tax-exempt bonds).
71 See Jensen, supra note 55, at 428 (questioning why stadium owners need a subsidy
when "essential public welfare programs" are being cut and eliminated due to budget
shortfalls); see Woolsey, supra note 61, at E08 (discussing a petition opposing use of public
funds that ultimately "will not benefit the local economy" as much as it would increase
wealth of "billionaires"); Congressman Stokes Opposes Sin Tax; Deals Serious Blow To
Issue 2, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 26, 1990 (noting a "question of economic priorities" where a
stadium would not raise money for "health, housing or education" but instead would only
"[go] into somebody's pocket").
72 See Gasper, supra note 30, at 348-49 (discussing creation of a second subsidy on the
second cycle); Socked for Stadiums, USA TODAY, June 28, 1996, at 12A (noting federal
taxpayers must pay not only for tax exemptions, but also for federal aid given directly for
stadiums); Taxpayers are the Losing Team, USA TODAY, Jan. 28, 2000, at 17A
(commenting on communities with budgets squandered on stadiums which are then
forced to apply for federal aid to fund education, and health programs).
73 See Gasper, supra note 30, at 349 (explaining second federal subsidy would be for
neglected state programs applying for federal aid); How You Pay $$$ for Stadiums Far,
Far Away, USA TODAY, June 5, 1997, at 14A (questioning why Cleveland should receive
$100 million from federal funds to clean up neighborhoods, but spent $400 million to build
stadium); Socked for Stadiums, supra note 72, at 12A (observing how communities using
own money for stadium financing apply for federal aid for other needed programs).
74 See Gasper, supra note 30, at 349 (describing lost opportunities for cities by funding
erection of new stadiums); Jensen, supra note 55, at 428 (noting how other local programs
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The tax structure currently in effect creates two negative
aspects that need to be changed. First, it is questionable whether
the federal government should be supporting tax subsidies for
professional sports owners who arguably, are some of the
wealthiest individuals or corporations in the country. 75 Second,
even if one agrees that the subsidization aspect is acceptable,
there should not be an incentive to use outside revenue streams
for funding when the stadium itself could generate a large
portion of the needed funds. This promotes cities to adopt fiscally
unsound principles to satisfy the federal requirements for tax-
exempt status.76
B. Legislative Action
In 1996, Senator Patrick Moynihan of New York recognized the
stadium subsidization problem with the Internal Revenue Code
he helped write 10 years earlier. 77 His proposal, known as
STADIA,78 (Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act)
attempted to close the loophole that allows city governments to
issue bonds for stadiums and remain outside the private activity
are deprived from tax subsidy for new stadiums); Taxpayers are the Losing Team, supra
note 72, at 17A (specifying money for fixing schools, hiring police, and cleaning up
neighborhoods are being tapped out by financing new stadiums).
75 See Stefan Fatsis, Disney Nears Sale of Baseball Team to Businessman, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 14, 2003, at B5 (discussing how new owner of Major League Baseball's Anaheim
Angels sold his company for more than eight billion dollars in 1999); Robert J. Samuelson,
The Stadium Game, WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 1997, at A13 (noting how Paul Allen, America's
third wealthiest man, would not buy Seattle Seahawks without guarantee of public
financing); Socked for Stadiums, supra note 72, at 12A (noting cities and states which
finance stadiums through municipal bonds never see revenue because owners pocket it).
76 See Jensen, supra note 55, at 433 (describing how Utah Jazz successfully financed a
new stadium without heavy public financing when their owner put up his own money
knowing he would be compensated by eventual stadium revenue); Parlow, supra note 31,
at 500 (noting the incentives for local governments to pay for stadiums as opposed to
franchise owners); see also Meredith Kane, Stadium Financing Increasingly Using Private
Fund Sources, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 19, 1999, at S4 (observing more recent trend of owners
pledging generated revenue into financing of stadiums where taxpayers show much
opposition to raised taxes for stadium funding).
77 See Fraas, supra note 55, at 210 (describing how bill would amend 1986 Tax Reform
Act originally proposed by Moynihan); Gasper, supra note 30, at 343 (identifying
Moynihan's rationale that tax-exempt municipal bonds transfer wealth to owners who do
not need any tax breaks); Goodman, supra note 9, at 217 (observing Moynihan's intention
to fix problems of 1986 tax reform act).
78 S. 1880, 104th Cong. (1996); see Two Bills Introduced By Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan (D-N)9 To Amend The Internal Revenue Code: "Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt
Issuance Act", in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS & LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY
1999, at 391, 394 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course
Handbook Series, Handbook Series No. GO-005E) (stating bill was referred by Mr.
Moynihan to Committee on Finance).
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classification. 79 Moynihan's reasoning had three premises.8 0
First, he was concerned that the real beneficiaries of these
federal subsidies were wealthy franchise owners.8 1 Second, he
believed that allowing tax-free interest on stadium construction
bonds was encouraging cities to become involved in spending well
beyond their means.8 2 Third, as one of the original drafters of
the 1986 Internal Revenue Code, including § 141, he felt that
subsidizing stadiums was not intended.8 3 Further, he stated that
the purpose of § 141 in the first instance was to stop this very
79 See 142 CONG. REC. S11103 (1996) (statement by Sen. Moynihan) ('This is why I
recently introduced S. 1880 ... to end the Federal tax subsidy for these stadium deals.");
see also Gasper, supra note 30, at 343 (noting the purpose behind Moynihan's proposal
was to stop utilization of tax-exempt bonds to finance new stadiums); Goodman, supra
note 9, at 217 (stating purpose of STADIA was to redress harmful effects of then-current
stadium subsidies).
80 See 142 CONG REC. S7205 (1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan), providing that:
This legislation is important in its own right, and would close a loophole
that ultimately injures State and local governments and other issuers of
tax exempt bonds, that provides an unintended federal subsidy-in fact,
contravenes Congressional intent-and that contributes to the enrichment
of persons who need no federal assistance whatsoever.
Id. See generally 142 CONG. REC. S11103 (reiterating Moynihan's original purposes of
wanting to pass 1986 bill into legislation); Gasper, supra note 30, at 349 (outlining
Moynihan's objectives in having 1986 bill).
81 See 142 CONG. REC. S11103 (1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) ("Only team
owners and players profit, while taxpayers and fans pick up the tab."). See generally
Leslie Wayne, Picking Up the Tabs for Fields of Dreams: Taxpayers Build Stadiums,
Owners Cash In, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1996, at 39 (noting wealthy owners are demanding
more revenue-generating options when building new stadiums); Socked for Stadiums,
supra note 72, at 12A (stating how owners reap all revenue from stadium that cities and
states finance through municipal bonds).
82 See 142 CONG REC. 86305 (1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) ('This legislation
will close a big loophole, a loophole that ultimately injures State and local governments
and other issuers of tax-exempt bonds."). See Parlow, supra note 31, at 494 (stating how
cities expend all their revenues that they tax all items, even those non-sports related);
Wayne, supra note 81, at 39 (noting how Baltimore has tapped out lottery proceeds and
raised taxes, merely to finance two new stadiums for baseball and football teams).
83 See 142 CONG REC. 86305 (1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan), providing that:
Unfortunately, Congress did not address the issue of whether stadium
bonds could be issued as governmental bonds because that possibility
was too remote to have occurred to us. And in our silence, a loophole was
born. Innovative bond counsel have devised aggressive schemes to
finance stadiums with tax-exempt, governmental purpose bonds. So this
legislation is corrective. It will put an end to a practice we thought we
had stopped in 1986.
Id. See generally Brent Bordson, Public Sports Stadium Funding: Communities Being
Held Hostage by Professional Sports Team Owners, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 505, 523-24
(1998) (stating how Moynihan felt communities were suffering from the tax structure in
place after 1986 bill); Mark Conrad, Public Stadium Subsidies: The Moynihan Proposal,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 6, 1999, at 5 (noting Moynihan's concern 1986 tax bill did not meet its
intended purpose of closing certain tax exempt practices).
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practice. 84 He explained that this was discussed prior to the
passage of the 1986 Internal Revenue Code amendments, and
changes were made with the exact purpose of eliminating bonds
for stadium construction from receiving tax-exempt interest
classification.8 5
Moynihan's approach would virtually end the subsidization
through the federal government for bonds issued to construct
stadiums. Eliminating federal subsidization would be
accomplished by adding a provision to § 141 specifically
classifying any bond used to finance a stadium as a private
activity bond.86 More importantly it would end the huge
incentive cities have in both issuing these bonds and finding
alternative revenue sources to pay for them.87 When the bill was
introduced, Moynihan stated, "building new professional sports
facilities is fine by me. Let the new stadiums be built. But,
please, do not ask the American taxpayer to pay for them."88 His
legislation would place the financial burden on the decision
maker: the city.
84 See 142 CONG. REC. S6306 ("[I]n 1986 we fundamentally restructured the tax
exempt bond rules. And one of the things we did was prohibit the issuance of tax-exempt
bonds to finance sports stadiums. Or so we thought."); see also Gasper, supra note 30, at
347 (specifying bonds for building new stadiums as private activity bonds that do not
qualify for exempt status in 1986 bill).
85 See 142 CONG. REC. S6306 (citing changes Moynihan and other senators had
intended upon implementation of 1986 tax bill); see also Dorocak, supra note 51, at 586
(discussing how Moynihan never intended sports stadiums to get tax-exempt status);
Gasper, supra note 30, at 345-46 (outlining amendments of 1986 bill, particularly two-
part test intended to make tax-exempt status difficult to achieve).
86 See S. 1880, 104th Congress (1996), providing that:
For purposes of this title, the term 'private activity bond' includes any bond
issued as part of an issue if the amount of the proceeds of the issue which
are to be used (directly or indirectly) to provide professional sports facilities
exceeds the lesser of -
(A) 5 percent of such proceeds, or
(B) $5,000,000
Id. See generally Fraas, supra note 55, at 210 (outlining specific amendments to bond
classification); Goodman, supra note 9, at 217 (setting forth amended terms of a private
activity bond).
87 See Fraas, supra note 55, at 210 (mentioning how cities used federal revenue from
other public programs to subsidize new stadiums); Gasper, supra note 30, at 347
(discussing how cities had to generate alternative revenues for at least 90% of financing
debt); Goodman, supra note 9, at 218 (highlighting some benefits cities would enjoy from
passing of STADIA).
88 142 CONG. REC. S6306 (1996). See generally David Burke, Legislative Reform: The
Stop Tax-Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act, 23 J. LEGIS. 149 (1997) (quoting Moynihan's
intention behind tax proposals); Wayne, supra note 81, at 39 (quoting Moynihan's concern
over who should deservedly pay for new stadiums).
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Moynihan's purpose and motives are both clear and correct. It
cannot be argued this will lower the burden on federal taxpayers
as a whole. However, construction costs for stadiums will
increase due to higher bond interest costs, which could add over
30%.89 This burden will ultimately be shifted back to the
taxpayers in the local market to cover the extra cost.90 So does
this really end the problem or just centralize it to the local
taxpayers? The larger reason for this problem stems from one of
Senator Moynihan's observations. He, along with other
commentators, has suggested that the increase in stadium
construction is due to the limited supply of franchises and an
increased demand for professional sports.91 Teams demand a
new taxpayer funded stadium or they will move to a city that will
comply.92 Because most teams are important to a city's
character, public officials will accept the franchise's demands and
build a publicly funded stadium at any cost.93 Obviously,
89 See Borden, supra note 83, at 528 (stating how construction costs often exceed $500
million); ZIMMERMAN supra note 53, at 10 (discussing increase in costs for constructing
stadium); see also IBO Report, supra note 63 (describing how city residents help subsidize
stadiums while wealthy citizens of New York suburbs reap benefits).
90 See Fraas, supra note 55, at 207 (specifying that taxpayers in some cities
contributed upwards around 90% of construction costs); Gasper, supra note 30, at 348
(noting that burden of financing stadium has shifted from those who will use it, the
owners and the cities, to "non-stadium-related resources", namely federal taxpayers);
Socked for Stadiums, supra note 72, at 12A (emphasizing how taxpayers pay subsidies for
new stadium while owners sit back and enjoy aftermath).
91 See Lathrope, supra note 37, at 1149 (discussing a franchise owner's advantage in
negotiating with a city due to the limited availability of sports franchises). See generally
Daniel S. Mason, Appropriate Opportunism or Bad Business Practice? Stakeholder
Theory, Ethics and the Franchise Relocation Issue, 7 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 399, 407 (1997)
(suggesting that teams threaten relocation to boost franchise value); THINK Teams With
NHL, Bus. WIRE (N.Y.), Nov. 17, 1997 (noting that there are a limited number of sports
franchises).
92 The real winners are the owners and professional sports teams, who are utterly
proficient in blackmailing local officials:
Buy me my stadium, rent it to me for a pittance or nothing, channel the
ticket and concession revenue to me, and if you don't like my deal, I'll skip
town and leave you, Mr. Mayor, with egg all over your face for having lost a
team.
Neal R. Peirce, Calling Time on Sports Tax Breaks, NAT'L J., July 20, 1996. See generally
Michael D. Kovalik, Subsidies Unfair? Depends on Who's Dining at the Public Trough,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 6, 2002, at 07A (which suggests that the government is too
willing to provide subsidies to appease sports teams); Tammi Murphy, Misplaced Outrage;
Subsidizing the NHL Would Have Been a Win-Win Situation for the Federal Government,
THE RECORD (Ontario), Jan. 25, 2000 (noting that some supporters of sports franchises
opine that when a team leaves a city, the local economy suffers).
93 See 145 CONG. REC. S4675 (1999) (statement of Sen. Specter) (stating that this is
nothing more than "legalized extortion"); see also Stadium Financing and Franchise
Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
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Senator Moynihan's legislation cannot remedy this problem, but
at least it can close the federal loophole. By closing this loophole,
the increased cost may dissuade a city from publicly financing a
stadium. 94 Closing the loophole could also encourage private
entities to finance a portion of the debt, taking some of the
burden off local taxpayers.95
III. STADIUM FINANCING AND
FRANCHISE RELOCATION ACT OF 1999
The supply and demand of stadiums has unquestionably led to
the relocation of several franchises in recent years. 96 Because
leagues can control how many teams can compete in their
respective sport, they control the supply of the teams.97 This
106th Cong. 31 (1999) (statement of Jean B. Cryor, delegate, Maryland House of
Delegates)
Today team owners are holding the baby captive and waiting for ransom.
They are using the fear of losing everything to force the ransom payment. It
is time to rescue the states and cities. Only the Federal Government can out-
muscle the team owners.
See generally David Prentice, Football: Together Our Clubs Can Send a Message To The
World About The City's Place in the Global Game, LIVERPOOL DAILY ECHO, Sept. 17, 2003,
at 46 (calling the cost of stadium construction "staggeringly expensive'); Norberto
Santanta, Jr., Task Force Draws Line on Stadium Financing; 'No Public Funds' for
Chargers, Group Plans to Tell City Council, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 21, 2003, at B1
(reporting recommendation of a citizen task force to deny public finding to stadium
construction).
94 See Take Me Out to a Public Fleecing, ENGINEERING NEwS-RECORD, Aug. 7, 2000, at
68 (observing that cities and tax payers tire of paying to lure franchises). But see Scott
Powers, Not Many Privately Built Arenas in Medium Cities, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 5,
1997, at 10C (noting that Columbus, Ohio decided out of necessity to build a stadium
solely with private funds).
95 See Powers, supra note 94 (documenting a city that built a stadium with private
funds exclusively). But see Leon Hickman, Let's Build Stadium For All Sports,
BIRMINGHAM EVENING MAIL, Dec. 11, 2000 at 43 (detailing disintegration of stadium
building plans due to lack of private investment); Saints Boss Welcomes Stadium Plans,
ST. HELENS GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2002 (chronicling that a major franchise was precluded
from building a new stadium when unable to procure private funding).
96 See generally Mason, supra note 91, at 403 (asserting that even financially well-off
organizations may relocate to more lucrative locations); Lathrope, supra note 37, 1150
(noting that franchises may receive multimillion dollar fees for relocation); Glen
Seredynski, On Team Relocation, League Expansion and Public Policy, 4 SETON HALL J.
SPORTS L. 663, 668-76 (1994) (analyzing an equation used to determine factors that make
a location economically desirable).
97 See Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 45 (1999) (statement of Dr.
Mark S. ROSENTRAUB, Professor and Associate Dean, School of Public and Environment
Affairs at Indiana University in Indianapolis) (commenting on power each league has in
controlling supply of franchises, thereby always creating demand for their product); see
also Prepared Testimony of Andrew Zimbalist Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary Subject -"Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999" (noting
both National Football League and Major League Ball have kept number of teams below
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supply and demand problem was addressed in the Stadium
Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999.98
This act was introduced by Senator Arlen Specter to remedy
the problem of franchise relocation. 99 In 1961, Congress passed
the Sports Broadcasting Act, which allowed a sports league to
sell their television rights as a whole and not violate anti-trust
laws.100 Senator Specter makes this exemption conditional on an
agreement that Major League Baseball and the National Football
league would place 10% of television revenue in a trust fund for
stadium construction.i01 Further, once a stadium was to be built,
the trust fund would be responsible for no more than 50% of the
number of cities competing for a franchise to bolster demand). See generally Sol Stern, No
to Sports Stadium Madness, CITY JOURNAL (N.Y.), Vol. 8, Fall 1998 (stating small number
of teams increases competition to bring a franchise to a city).
98 S. 952, 106th Congress, May 4, 1999. See Zimbalist, supra note 97 (noting demand
increases competition among cities for franchises). See generally Angelo Bruscas, My
Stadium's Better Than Your Stadium, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 14, 1999
(opining that demand gives franchises "absolute sovereignty" as to where they settle their
teams).
99 See S. 952, 106th Congress, May 4, 1999 (statement of Sen. Specter) (introducing
terms and goals of Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999). See
generally Stephen Goldfein, Relocation of Professional Sports Teams: Protecting the
Championship Season, 14 ANTITRUST ABA 63, 66 (2000) (suggesting unregulated
relocation could lead to economic chaos both for teams and related cities); Stephen Ross,
Myths, Realities and Creative Approaches to Antitrust and Franchise Relocation Issues, 14
ANTITRUST ABA 57, 58 (2000) (noting there is little recourse available to communities
have been hurt by a franchise relocation).
100 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (1997)
The antitrust laws... shall not apply to any joint agreement by or among
persons engaging in or conducting the organized professional team sports of
football, baseball, basketball, or hockey, by which any league of clubs
participating in professional football, baseball, basketball, or hockey
contests sells or otherwise transfers all or any part of the rights of such
league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games of football,
baseball, basketball, or hockey, as the case may be, engaged in or conducted
by such clubs.
See generally Alan Fecteau, NFL Network Blackouts: Old Law Meets New Technology
with the Advent of the Satellite Dish, 5 MARQ. SPORTS. L.J. 221, 231 (1995) (analyzing
impact of the Sports Broadcasting Act); Brett T. Goodman, The Sports Broadcasting Act:
as Anachronistic as the Dumont Network?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 469, 470 (1995)
(calling Sports Broadcasting Act the "the single most important piece of legislation
governing sports television.").
101 S.952 § 1(b)(1)(A) (making anti-trust exemption conditional on each league
establishing "a special trust fund into which the league will deposit an amount equal to 10
percent of the amounts received under that joint agreement for the sale or transfer of the
rights in sponsored telecasting of the games of the professional sport of that league in the
United States."). See generally Sherie Winston & Tom Ichniowski, Bill Asks Teams to
Fund New Construction, WASH. OBSERVER, June 21, 1999, at 9 (reporting terms of the
Act); Stadium Funding Trend Under Attack, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, May 5, 1999, at 2D
(noting ten percent requirement is in exchange for antitrust exemption in certain areas).
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total cost of any individual stadium.102 The trust fund's payment
would be conditional only on a city spending $1 for every $2 that
the fund contributes.103 The legislation would also increase the
anti-trust exemption to allow a league to stop a team from
relocating to a new city.104 Senator Specter suggests that the
only way to protect local taxpayers is to limit a team's ability to
relocate, while at the same time taking a majority of the cost
burden off the public.' 05 His main reason for requiring leagues to
pay for a percentage of the stadium is the value it adds to the
franchise.106 It is no secret that when a team receives a new
stadium, regardless of who actually owns the structure, the value
of the franchise as a whole increases. 107 If an owner is
contemplating selling a team, his most profitable tactic could be
102 S.952 § 1(b)(1)(A)(iv) (making anti-trust exemption conditional on a league making
available proceeds from trust fund, but limited "up to a maximum of one-half of that
cost"). See generally Stopping Pro Sports Extortion, SAN FRAN. CHRON., July 5, 1999, at
A19 (calling the franchises' ability to demand stadiums and facilities "legalized
extortion"); Tagliabue Fights Bill to Pay For Stadiums, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale),
June 23, 1999, at 9C (noting NFL Commissioner's strong resistance to the 50%
requirement).
103 S.952 § 1(b)(1)(A)(iv)(I) (making a league's payment of funds conditional on the
local government matching half of the league contribution). See generally Martin J.
Greenberg, Sports Facilities and Development: Stadium Financing and Franchise
Relocation Act of 1999, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 383, 398 (2002) (acknowledging matching
funds requirement could put a local government in debt for up to one-third of the cost of
stadium, a result Thomas M. Finneran calls "troubling"); Robinson, supra note 55, at 163
(arguing trust fund requirement still does not alleviate burden on taxpayers).
104 S. 952 § 1(a)(2)(C) (allowing a league under these agreements to deny the right to
relocate a franchise). See 145 CONG. REC. 84674 (discussing enlargement of antitrust
exemption to deny relocation requests). See generally Robinson, supra note 55, at 163
(analyzing different approaches to relocation regulation through antitrust immunity).
105 145 CONG. REC. S4674 (1999) (statement of Sen. Specter)
One would think some of that giant revenue windfall might trickle down
and be used to help finance new ballparks and stadiums, which produce
greatly enhanced revenues for team owners, yet it seems the more TV
money a league makes, the more its clubs demand from local taxpayers to
fund the construction of new playing facilities.
See generally Jensen, supra note 55, at 427 (noting in one study, tax money paid sixty-five
percent of stadium costs); Greenberg, supra note 103, at 384 (acknowledging money for
stadium construction comes from myriad public taxes on accommodations, beverages,
tobacco, ticket charges, property taxes and other charges).
106 145 CONG. REC. 4673 (1999) (statement of Sen. Specter) (quoting Jeffrey Stein,
"new stadiums in and of themselves significantly enhance the value of a team."). See
generally Stadium Would Nearly Double Value of Brewers, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison), Feb.
23, 1996 at IC (stating a new stadium would increase the value of Milwaukee Brewers by
$67 million dollars); New Digs Often Adds Value, Magazine Says, USA TODAY, May 2,
1996, at 3C (noting an increase in team value is often due to stadium construction).
107 See 145 CONG. REC. 4673 (1999) (noting franchises' value increases due to stadium
construction); see also Fraas, supra note 55, at 206 (stating, "professional team owners
benefit from new facilities through their teams' increased value."). See generally Patriots
Owner Links Staying to New Stadium, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), May 27, 1993, at
D2 (reporting a new stadium "increases value of the team to prospective buyers.").
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to demand a new stadium to increase the return on his
investment. This is exactly the behavior Senator Specter is
trying to prevent. 108
Both Senator Moynihan's and Senator Specter's bills would
reduce the tax burden on citizens while possibly stopping their
hometown team from leaving.109 All the intended effects would
be beneficial to the public.11 0 If these bills benefit the general
public, then why are they still just proposals that have not been
passed? Senator Specter and others have noted the tremendous
lobbying pressure placed on Congressional members by the
respective leagues."' The leagues realize their franchises have
the advantage in this current environment and do not want to
relinquish this.112 One commentator noted that the leagues,
along with franchise owners and a few investment bankers, are
the only real opponents to reform in stadium finance.113
108 See John Barron, United Center Lifts Bulls, Hawks in Franchise Value, CHIC. SUN-
TIMES, Apr. 19, 1995, at 63 (stating "new venues have resulted in a big increase in team
values and profitability"). But see Jay Weiner, Forbes: Vikings' Value Leaps 24% From
Last Year, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Sept. 7, 1999, at 4C (detailing value of the Vikings
franchise increased 24% even without the construction of a desired new stadium).
109 See generally Luke Cyphers, Can't Get One By Pat: Senator Throws Curve at
Owners, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), July 1, 1997, at 64 (noting Moynihan's bill would attempt to
prevent teams from relocating at lure of a new stadium in another town and that federal
taxpayers should not bear burden of keeping teams from leaving town or attracting teams
to town); Robinson, supra note 55, at 162-63 (stating Senator Specter's purpose in
proposing bill was to prevent franchise relocation but disagreeing it will have impact of
lightening tax burdens). See generally Michael D. Erickson, Note, Upon Further
Review... When It Comes To Tax-Exempt, Stadium Finance Reform, Stop Cheering for the
Popular Proposals and Adopt Simple Reform, 21 VA. TAX REV. 603, 613-29 (2002)
(describing both pieces of potential legislation and arguing likely effects of bills).
110 See Gasper, supra note 30, at 350-51 (favoring Moynihan's rationale for STADIA
legislation); see also Marc D. Oram, The Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act
of 1999, 2 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 184, 211 (2000) (suggesting general support for notion
behind Specter's legislation if not for particular legislation itself). But see Erickson, supra
note 109, at 616-24, 626-28 (arguing neither bill is beneficial and that the rationales
behind them are extremely flawed).
111 145 CONG. REC. 4674 (revealing several Senators dropped out of supporting the bill
after being pressured by Major League Baseball's lobbying efforts). See Eric Fisher, Bill
Capping Tax Money for Stadiums Is Attacked on Capitol Hill, WASH. TIMES, June 16,
1999, at B3 (articulating heated opposition to Specter's bill and noting NFL's opposition);
Greenberg, supra note 103, at 398 (pointing out that the sports lobby would actively
oppose Specter's legislation).
112 See generally Bhasin, supra note 41, at 200 (including sports leagues as one of the
major opponents of reform); Rodney Fort, Sports Facilities and Development: Stadiums
and Public and Private Interest in Seattle, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 311, 330 (2000) (noting
sports leagues' market power); Oram, supra note 110, at 204 (calling various leagues'
responses in opposition to Specter's proposed changes "predictable").
113 See Stelzer, supra note 65 (characterizing objectors to stadium finance reform as,
"kicking and screaming objections of the nation's politically potent mayors, its bond-
issuing investment bankers and its itinerant team-owners"); see also Bhasin, supra note
41, at 200 (listing team owners, investment bankers, and sports leagues among opponents
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However, these groups have the lobbying power to impede any
proposed legislation.
STADIA and the Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation
Act of 1999 bring to light the problems of the current structure.
Although both proposed bills were not passed, they demonstrate
the kind of restraint that Congress should apply.114 Reform must
come at the federal level, either through new legislation or
amending previous bills. The fact remains that the only people
benefiting are the franchise owners, who, most would agree, do
not need additional wealth.ll5 To not only protect innocent
taxpayers, but also sports enthusiasts who have a hometown
team, Congress should intervene and reform the process. 116
IV. FRANCHISE OWNER'S RESPONSE
It is not surprising that franchise owners bemoan any type of
change to the current structure of stadium finance.117 They have
leverage on local city governments, which gives them power to
of STADIA); Burke, supra note 88, at 155 (recording investment banks and sports leagues
as some of those lobbying against STADIA).
114 See generally Bruce Alpert, Taxpayer Financing of Arenas Targeted, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), July 7, 1996, at Al (repeating Moynihan's argument in support
of STADIA and against "twisted logic" of use of tax-exempt bonds to finance sports
arenas); Burke, supra note 88, at 156 (calling STADIA "a logical solution to a gaping
loophole in the federal tax laws"); Stadiums Are Built On Federal Tax Break, supra note
70, at A01 (observing Senator Byron Dorgan's support for changing the tax-exempt bond
financing for sports stadiums).
115 See Walt Disney Company and Subsidiaries 2002 Annual Report, at 49
(recognizing $1.2 billion of net income for 2002), at
http://i.disney.go.com/disneygo/corporate/investors/financials/annual/2002
/pdfs/ar_- 2002.pdf (last visited on Feb. 3, 2004). The Walt Disney Company, a very
profitable corporation who does not need any public subsidies, owns the Anaheim Angels,
who won the World Series in 2002. See also Goodman, supra note 9, at 217 (articulating
Senator Moynihan's view that current tax situation provides for "enrichment of persons
who need no Federal assistance whatsoever").
116 The Fans Rights Act of 1995, S. 1439, 104th Cong. (1995); Professional Sports
Franchise Stabilization Act of 1992, H.R. 5713, 102nd Cong. (1992). Both statutes were
failed attempts by Congress to regulate the relocation of professional sports franchises.
See Greenberg, supra note 103, at 398.
117 Cf. Jonathan R. Laing, Foul Play?, BARRONS, Aug. 19, 1996, at 23, available at
1996 WL 10421857 (characterizing the balance of power between team owners and
stadium authorities as dramatically in favor of the sports teams). Compare Oram, supra
note 110, at 204 (calling the response of sports leagues to the Stadium Financing and
Franchise Relocation Act "predictable") with Mark S. Rosentraub, Governing Sports in the
Global Era: A Political Economy of Major League Baseball and It's Shareholders, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 121, 130 (2000) (describing the formation of leagues as furthering
the owners interest in maximizing profits, to support contention that the owners are
happy with the current system structure).
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demand more than what is needed. 118 They also have the
advantages of the federal tax code to provide them with a
subsidy.119 The owners' main response to the argument that
they do not need subsidization is to claim that their franchise is
financially unsound. They argue that paying for a stadium will
decrease revenues, creating fewer available resources to operate
the team. 120 Further, this will have a negative effect on team
performance, because there is not enough available cash to meet
the market demand for salaries, in turn, creating a non-
competitive team. 121 This was the basic argument in St. Louis
and is used by owners today as support for the need for
subsidization. 122
In 1988, the St. Louis Cardinals decided to relocate to Phoenix,
Arizona, leaving behind a city without an NFL franchise. 123 In
118 See Rosentraub, supra note 117, at 137 (noting supply of franchises is controlled by
league and franchise owners). Rosentraub also discusses the alternatives to this model,
whereby the supply is controlled by various "nation-states." Id. This is the structure for
professional soccer in Europe, with the governing body, FIFA, controlling the leagues, but
not the supply or location of the franchises. Id. This leaves private investors the
opportunity to start their own team and still benefit from being part of a competitive
league. Id. at 140-41. See also Burke, supra note 88, at 149 (outlaying team owners
demands on local municipalities); Laing, supra note 117, at 23 (describing municipalities
as "at the mercy of team owners").
119 See generally I.R.C. § 141 (2003); Bhasin, supra note 41, at 185-86 (emphasizing
common use of tax exempt bonds in sports stadium financing); Parlow, supra note 31, at
500 (noting nearly all stadiums are financed with tax-exempt bonds).
120 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 488-89 (arguing sports franchises cannot afford to
completely fund a new stadium due to small profit margins); see also Bhasin, supra note
41, at 208 (describing the federal subsidy of financing of stadiums as "much needed"). See
generally Mark Roesslein, It's Make-or-Break Time for Baseball Here, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Apr. 7, 1996, at 4 (illustrating example from Major League Baseball of a team
in financial trouble due to stadium financing difficulty).
121 See Jensen, supra note 55, at 426 (articulating argument made by owners to
taxpayers that without a new stadium they "will be forced to field sub-par teams"); see
also Baker, supra note 37, at 298 (expressing owners' concern for more money to pay for
rising cost of players). See generally Parlow, supra note 31, at 490-91 (linking value of
sports team directly to stadium revenue).
122 See Robinson, supra note 55, at 143 (relating owners' argument that new facilities
are crucial to attraction and maintenance of quality players); see also Linda Grant
Williams, Use of Securitization Techniques in Financing Sports Facilities in NEW
DEVELOPMENTS IN SECURITIZATION 2000, at 757, 766 (PLI Commercial Law and Practice
Course, Handbook Series No. AO-004U, 2000) (characterizing team owners' notion they
need new stadiums to keep best players). See generally Parlow, supra note 31, at 519
(citing St. Louis Rams as an example of a team that has improved because of profitability
linked to new stadium).
123 See Franklin M. Fisher et al., The Economics of Sports Leagues and the Relocation
of Teams: The Case of the St. Louis Rams, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 193, 198 (2000) (noting
the move of St. Louis franchise to Phoenix); 1988 Year in Sports From Seoul To San Diego
To Chicago, There Was No Shortage of Memories, CHIC. TRIB., Dec. 27, 1988, at C10
(noting league approved relocation to Phoenix of the St. Louis Cardinals); Laurel Shaper
Walters, St. Louis Blues: Fans Threaten Suit as NFL Blocks Rams Exit, CHRISTIAN SCI.
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1993, when the league expanded, St. Louis was not awarded a
franchise, even though they had already begun construction on a
stadium. 24 However, in 1995 St. Louis secured an agreement
with the Los Angeles Rams to relocate and begin play in St.
Louis.125 The Rams franchise went to the league for approval of
the relocation but was denied initially because the league wanted
a relocation fee. 126 Instead of continued negotiations, the city
gave in and agreed to pay $20 million of a total $29 million
fee. 127 This is significant because not only did it add a
considerable cost to the relocation effort, it later produced anti-
trust litigation by the city, through its Convention and Visitors
Commission (CVC).128 The CVC was assigned the lease on the
MONITOR (Boston), Mar. 20, 1995, at 8 (mentioning departure of Cardinals from St. Louis
to Phoenix in 1988).
124 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. National Football League, 154 F.3d
851, 853 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating, "Problems associated with control over the lease and the
potential ownership group caused St. Louis to be passed over in the NFL's expansion
voting"); see also Fisher et al., supra note 123, at 198 (noting the "poor bargaining
position" of the city by beginning construction of a stadium before a franchise was secured
to play there); Jim Salter, St. Louis Now a Football Town (reporting St. Louis lost out on
its bid for one of two NFL expansion teams in 1993 even though a stadium was already
under construction), at http://espn.go.com/nfl/playoffs99/conf/s/O116ramsfans .html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2004).
125 See Alvin B. Lindsay, Our Team, Our Name, Our Colors: The Trademark Rights of
Cities in Team Name Ownership, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 915, 915 (2000) (noting the Rams
relocation in 1995); Raiders Get New Trial Against the NFL, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002,
at 1 (affirming Rams' relocation from Los Angeles to St. Louis in 1995); Leonard Shapiro,
For the NFL, a Team in L.A. Rates High, WASH. POST, May 17, 2002, at D10
(acknowledging Rams departure from Los Angeles to St. Louis in 1995).
126 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 855 (stating "[o]wners
voted down the initial application by the Rams because of disagreements between the
league and the team on several of the relocation terms, including payment of a relocation
fee..."); Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National
Football League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 501 (1997) (reporting NFL initially vetoed
attempts of Rams to relocate until they agreed to pay a higher relocation fee); Leveling the
Playing Field: Relevant Product Market Definition in Sports Franchise Relocation Cases,
2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 245, at 246 n.6 (2000) (suggesting real reason behind NFL's
allowance of Rams' relocation was eventual agreement to pay relocation fee).
127 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 853 (noting Ram's
agreement to pay relocation fee and CVC's agreement to pay $20 million of the fee which
later defaulted on); Fisher et al., supra note 123, at 198-99 (discussing league's refusal of
first proposal and second agreement which included the relocation fee); St. Louis Loses
Conspiracy Lawsuit Against NFL, CBS SPORTSLINE WIRE REPORTS (Sept. 3, 1998) (noting
St. Louis paid more than $70 million to acquire Rams including $20 million of $29 million
relocation fee), at http://cbs.sportsline.com/u/football/nfl/1998/weekO1/news/
stlouis90398.htm.
128 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Commission, 154 F.3d at 853 (noting a four
week jury trial was held in which NFL won); see also Fisher, supra note 123, at 198
(explaining how 'The St. Louis CVC claimed that NFL relocation policies had caused city
to receive 'firesale' lease terms for its stadium or, equivalently, that NFL's relocation
policies had caused city to greatly "overpay" to get Rams."); Angela Scafuri, Antitrust -
Restraint On Trade - National Football League Relocation Policies do not Create an
Anticompetitive Environment - St. Louis Convention & Visitors Commission v. National
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dome to sublease and manage, but they are controlled mainly by
the city. 129 Ultimately, the Rams moved into town with all
moving expenses paid for,130 75% of advertising revenue from
the dome,131 personal seat license revenue of $74 million,132
luxury suite revenue, 133 $1.3 million per year in naming
rights,134 and an opt-out provision if the dome is not ranked in
the top 25% of all NFL stadiums.135 This deal allows the Rams
Football League, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 575, 577 (1999) (stating how "[CVC] brought
an action against the NFL, alleging that the NFL rules for relocation violated both
antitrust and tort laws.").
129 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 853 (describing how lease
was assigned to CVC who initially subleased right to present football to private parties);
see also St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission Annual Report and Plan of Work,
25 (explaining CVC's board consists of a chairman that is appointed by the governor, five
members appointed by mayor, and five members appointed by County Executive), at
http://www.slcvc.comlpdf/annualReport/AnnualReport 2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004);
St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority, Report No. 2003-75, 2 (Mo.
State Auditor July 25, 2005) (noting St. Louis Regional and Convention Sports Complex
Authority has leased dome to St. Louis Convention and Visitors Commission), available at
http://www.auditor.state.mo.us/press/2003-75.htm.
130 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 854 (noting the CVC
ultimately agreed to a number of obligations including paying for team's moving
expenses); see also Negrin supra note 20, at 508 (noting Rams were granted $46 million
cash relocation bonus). See generally Parlow, supra note 31, at 518 (discussing how three
levels of St. Louis government "do not collect enough yearly or up-front revenue from the
team or other sources to cover their debt payments.").
131 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 854 (noting actual terms
were for 75% of first $6 million in advertising revenue and 90% beyond $6 million
threshold); see also Erickson, supra note 109, at 635 (reaffirming 75% of advertising
profits and naming rights fees were given to Rams to help lure them to St. Louis). See
generally Parlow, supra note 31, at 518-19 (noting that 75% of stadium's advertising
revenue was given to Rams).
132 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Corm'n, 154 F.3d at 854 (stating in return for
relocating to St. Louis, Rams would receive all of ticket revenues from home games); see
also Lisa-Michele Smith, supra note 25, at 324 n.101 (2000) (estimating PSL revenue at
$75 million for St. Louis Rams); Parlow, supra note 31, at 518-19 (explaining "the
agreement provide[d] for Rams to receive all $ 74 million generated by sale of PSLs.").
133 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 518 (noting how team will receive all revenue from
122 luxury suites and additionally 6200 premium club seats); see also Erickson, supra
note 109, at 635 (explaining that as part of city's technique to persuade Rams to relocate,
city offered all luxury box, ticket, and concession revenues). See generally St. Louis
Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 854 (noting Rams would receive all ticket
revenues from Rams' home games).
134 See Negrin, supra note 20, at 508 (stating in addition to lack of a rental
requirement, team retained $1.3 million naming rights for Trans World America (TWA)
dome); see also Erikson, supra note 131, at 635 (noting Rams were offered 75% of all
advertising and naming rights). See generally St. Louis Convention & Visitors Corm'n,
154 F.3d at 854 (noting Rams were to receive 75% of first $6 million in advertising
revenue and 90% of remainder).
135 See Negrin, supra note 20, at 508 (discussing requirement of stadium being in top
25% of stadiums); see also Erickson, supra note 109, at 635 (describing escape clause
stated "if the stadium fails to remain among the most lavish in football for ten years, the
Rams are free to leave for greener pastures"); Jo Mannies, Rams Stay Is Tied to
"Ranking" of New Stadium After 10 Years, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 26, 1996, at
11A (questioning how one will determine or measure the top 25% of stadiums).
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to keep virtually all revenue from the stadium.136 The CVC
receives roughly $250,000 per year in what is deemed "rent" from
ticket sales.13 7 The city and state also get admissions taxes
based on attendance, estimated at $1 million per year. 138 It does
not take a sophisticated financier to realize this lease is
completely one-sided. 139 It has also been widely regarded as one
of the biggest sweetheart deals in sports franchise history.140
But, the astonishing numbers are not what the Rams receive, but
rather what the CVC loses, which ultimately falls on the city and
state. The CVC paid nearly $300 million for the construction and
maintenance of the stadium before any of the other costs, such as
the relocation fee. 14 1 Taking this into account, the CVC gets back
136 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 854 (explaining due to
lease, Rams were to additionally obtain 100% of profit from concessions at Rams games,
as well as a portion of concession profits from other events at dome); see also Parlow,
supra note 31, at 518 (noting "the revenue-sharing facet of the financial agreement
between the three governments and the Rams is lopsided in favor of the team"). See
generally Erikson, supra note 131, at 635 (stating Rams franchise was given all ticket,
luxury box, and concession revenues).
137 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 854 (noting Rams agreed
to pay CVC $ 25,000 rent per game, plus an additional half of game day expenses); see
also Erikson, supra note 131, at 635 (discussing how city of St. Louis offered Rams very
low rent ($250,000) for use of brand new, state-of-the-art domed stadium); Parlow, supra
note 31, at 519 (discussing how St. Louis's portion of the revenue will be $250,000 rent
and additionally $1 million in admission taxes and 25% of a portion of stadium revenue).
138 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 519 (stating in addition to annual rent, city was to
receive annual admission taxes). See generally Mark S. Rosentraub, Defined Gross
Revenues, the Triggering Event, and the San Diego Chargers: A Report on Economic Issues
for the Citizen's Task Force on Charger's Issues, at 3 (Oct. 2002) (stating Defined Gross
Revenues of NFL franchises include gate receipts minus net admission taxes and
surcharges paid to stadium or municipal authorities), at http:/www.
sannet.gov/chargersissues/pdf/reportattachc.pdf.
139 See Negrin, supra note 20, at 507 ("One sided leases have become the norm and are
often the only way a city can keep its home team. Two prime examples come from recent
franchise movements involving the St. Louis Rams...."); see also Parlow, supra note 31, at
519 (noting deal for lease cost taxpayer's hundreds of millions of dollars while providing a
miniscule amount of return revenue). See generally Negrin, supra note 20, at 509 (quoting
Joanna Cagan & Neil DeMause, Field of Schemes: How the Great Stadium Swindle Turns
Public Money into Private Profit 1, 30 (1998)) (explaining effects of a city's desperation for
a sports team, "[bly shackling themselves to these massive debts (and often massive cost
overruns), cities may very well have allo ved the further deterioration of local schools,
roads, and public services").
140 David Elfin, Rams'Arrival Chases Away Those St. Louis Blues, WASH. TIMES, Dec.
17, 1995, at C1 (quoting former Philadelphia Eagles owner Norman Braman) (describing
St. Louis deal as "the mother of all stadium deals"). But see Erikson, supra note 131, at
635 (stating "although the St. Louis deal could become a laughing stock, the St. Louis deal
could equally probably become the best thing ever to happen to St. Louis."). See generally
Parlow, supra note 31, at 519 (explaining how "[the] deal provides tremendous financial
benefits for the Rams, enabling them to maximize profits and thus improve the worth of
the franchise.").
141 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 853 (noting $258 million
cost); see also Greenberg, supra note 103, at 392 (estimating cost of St. Louis's Dome to be
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about 10% of what they spend each year on the dome.142 This
significant loss each year on the original investment is surely not
what the St. Louis and Missouri legislators contemplated.
This deal shows the extremes that a city or state will reach in
trying to obtain a franchise. It should be noted that part of this
deal is due to the lack of bargaining power the city had.143 They
already began building the stadium without a team, which was
probably one cause for the extremes of the contract. 144
The reason this deal is cited by franchise owners is because it
best supports their economic theory. This "sweetheart deal"
allowed the Rams to increase their pay roll and attract better
players,145 which subsequently led to the Rams being one of the
most dominant teams in the league.146 They won the Superbowl
$300 million); Parlow, supra note 31, at 518 (noting total cost of stadium was $258 million
plus a $4 million per year payment by CVC for thirty years).
142 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 519 (noting how dome in St. Louis and lease with
Rams has been a bad investment for local taxpayers). But see Erikson, supra note 131, at
835 (explaining that although risks are tremendous in recent stadium deals and the
dollar amounts staggering, their magnitude cannot categorically classify the deals as
wrong). See generally Negrin, supra note 20, at 508 (explaining how all in all, the "Rams'
total subsidy over the 30-year term of lease will equal $1.07 billion, amounting to a public
cost [to the city] of roughly $ 36 million per year").
143 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 853 (implying city's
desperation when it failed to obtain an expansion franchise by stating that the result
"forced the St. Louis football enthusiasts to adopt another strategy [by turning] their
attention toward attracting an existing team."); see also Erikson, supra note 131, at 835
(discussing how critics of local government stadium finance view lease as an absurd deal
between city of St. Louis and NFL's Rams, where St. Louis was simply offering Rams so
many rights to revenue in an attempt to coax Rams' to relocate).
144 See St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n, 154 F.3d at 853 (detailing fact
stadium was constructed originally in a bid to win an expansion franchise, which later
proved unsuccessful); Fisher et al., supra note 123, at 198 (noting lack of bargaining
power city had in negotiations with franchise because of early construction). See generally
Scafuri, supra note 128, at 579 (discussing how CVC built Convention Center, which
included a new football stadium as means for attracting one of two NFL expansion
franchises).
145 See generally Ed Bouchette, Standing Up to the Competition, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
Aug. 24, 2001, at Tabs 2 (noting NFL teams with better stadium deals are in a position to
spend more money to acquire better players); Jacob Luft, Relocation Celebrations: NFL,
NHL Franchises Find Success in New Cities (Jan. 26, 2001) (noting St. Louis Rams
parlayed a revenue windfall from a stadium in a new city into a bid for the Super Bowl),
at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/statitudes/news/2001/ 01/25/relocationcelebration;
Parlow, supra note 31, at 519 (describing how generous terms of financial agreement
between government and St. Louis Rams allowed team to improve by increasing its
payroll).
146 See generally Dave Goldberg, The St. Louis Rams are Back as a Power in the NFC
West Division (Aug. 27, 2003) (stating St. Louis Rams dominated the NFL since 1999), at
http://ca.sports.yahoo.com/030827/6/ugfg.html; St. Louis Rams History, CBS
Sportsline.com (showing since the stadium deal, the St. Louis Rams have made three
playoff appearances, won two division championships, two conference championships, and
one Super Bowl), at http://www.sportsline. comlnfl/teams/history/STL (last visited Feb. 3,
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in 2000,147 and once again advanced to the final game in 2002,
where they lost to the New England Patriots.148 Owners argue
the Rams success is due to the revenues made available by their
stadium, and have allowed greater flexibility in contracting with
players.149 This argument seems to fail because financial
superiority does not always equal on-field success.150 Rather, it
allows an owner to spend more carelessly, while still being able
to make a profit.
Like the St. Louis example, there is nothing wrong with
allowing a team to keep a large percentage of the revenue a
stadium generates; in fact, this is probably preferred. But if a
team does receive most of the stadium revenue, they should pay
some of the cost to build the stadium. This solution shifts the
risk of a team's failure on the franchise. When a team is allowed
to take most of the stadium revenue in exchange for paying a
portion of the stadium construction, they are taking the risk that
the team will not be successful.151 The effect of fielding a losing
2004); Luft, supra note 145 (noting revenue windfall from a new stadium helped catapult
the St. Louis Rams to the Super Bowl).
147 See generally Stu Durando, Jones Wraps Up Dyson, Championship For Rams, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 31, 2000, at D7 (describing St. Louis Rams' defeat of
Tennessee Titans in Super Bowl XXXIV); St. Louis Rams History, supra note 146
(showing that St. Louis Rams finished first in their division in the 1999 season and
reached Super Bowl XXXIV); Super Bowl Recaps, Superbowl.com (showing St. Louis
Rams beat Tennessee Titans in Super Bowl XXXIV on January 30, 2000), at
http://www.superbowl.com/history/recaps (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
148 See generally Joe Strauss, Heartbreaker: Vinatieri's Field Goal on Final Play Beats
Rams, ST. LouiS POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2002, at Al (describing New England Patriot's
defeat of St. Louis Rams in Super Bowl XXXVI); St. Louis Rams History, supra note 146
(showing St. Louis Rams finished second in their division in 2000 season, which resulted
in a trip to Super Bowl XXXVI); Super Bowl Recaps, supra, note 147 (showing New
England Patriots defeated St. Louis Rams in Super Bowl XXXVI on Feb. 3, 2002).
149 See generally Jensen, supra note 55, at 426 (discussing owners' claims that teams
will be unable to remain competitive unless they can attract better players by
constructing new stadiums); Parlow, supra note 31, at 519 (noting how stadium deal
resulted in an increased payroll for Rams);
, supra note 55, at 143 (describing owner assertions that new stadium facilities that
generate increased revenues are critical in attracting quality players).
150 See generally Ken Berger & Gregg Sara, Namath: These Jets Not Worth Woody's
Money, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Nov. 16, 2002, at A37 (contrasting New York Jets' 2002 season
payroll, which at $87.3 million was highest in NFL, with its 2002 season 9-7 record);
Stephen Harris, Hockey: NHL Notes, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 27, 2003, at B07 (observing
NHL teams with highest payrolls, including New York Rangers, Detroit Redwings, and
Colorado Avalanche, were all first-round playoff losers); Tracy Ringolsby, New Parks
Don't Always Lead to Riches, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), Dec. 20, 2002, at 20C (noting
while a new stadium can have an impact on baseball team revenue, it does not guarantee
team success).
151 See generally Jensen, supra note 55, at 457 (noting alternate means of stadium
financing would encourage teams, leagues, and politicians to more carefully analyze risks
and returns of stadium deals); Parlow, supra note 31, at 509 (discussing projected sources
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team will result in lower stadium revenue because fewer people
will attend the games.152 This will lead to the owner's profits
being diminished because they have already committed resources
to paying for the stadium construction over a period of time. 153
This financing plan is preferable to the St. Louis plan. It allows
a city to pay for a portion of construction, but promotes
accountability in the team's ownership, which the St. Louis Plan
did not. A city should consider the stadium as an investment,
and such investment requires accountability and smart financial
decisions.154 Allowing teams to receive a large portion of stadium
revenue makes these objectives possible.
V. JUSTIFICATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES FOR STADIUM
CONSTRUCTION
Much is made of how much a stadium costs the public, but a
more basic question is why does a city or state feel compelled to
of revenue such as sales taxes and ticket sales used to secure investors are actually
uncertain because they rely on team popularity); Ringolsby, supra note 150, at 20C
(noting excitement of a new stadium can provide initial revenue boosts but such boosts
can prove temporary as newness of stadium fades).
152 See generally Parlow, supra note 31, at 509 (discussing fielding better teams can
prolong stadium attendance booms, resulting in higher revenues); Tom Haudricourt,
Looking For More With Less: Smaller Payroll Likely for 2004 Brewers, Jsonline.com (Sept.
29, 2003) (noting because of declining attendance that revenue of Milwaukee Brewers,
who finished last in 2003 National League Central Division, continues to fall), at
http://www.jsonline.com/sportsIbrew/sep03/173574.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2004); Carlos
Moncada, Rays Attendance Dives Deeper, TAMPA TRIB., June 15, 2003, at Metro 1
(discussing dwindling revenue of the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, who finished last in the
American League East Division in 2003).
153 See generally Doug Bandow, Surprise! Stadiums Don't Pay After All, WASH. POST,
Oct. 19, 2003, at B01 (noting financial benefits for teams that manage to avoid cost of
financing stadiums); Ralph Nader, Baseball's Stadium Shakedown, WASH. POST, Jul. 13,
2003, at B07 (arguing owners who receive stadium subsidies ultimately enjoy windfall
profits upon team sales); Ji H. Chong, Stadium Subsidies, bailoutwatch.org (Aug. 7, 2002)
(commenting profits of professional sports franchise owners are increasing partly due to
stadium subsidies), at http://www.bailoutwatch.org/stadium.htm.
154 See generally Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs and Taxes: Are New
Stadiums Worth the Cost? (Summer 1997) (outlining potential contract provisions for
cities determined to protect their investment in subsidized stadiums, including provisions
that deter team relocation, eminent domain provisions, and more), at
http://www.Brook.edu/press/review/summer97/noll.htm; Daniel Sutter, Public Subsidies
for Sports Stadiums Don't Spur Economic Growth (Apr. 2002) (proposing a rubric for
economic-impact studies that would provide more accurate projections of job creation and
other economic effects of teams and stadiums), at http://www.ocpathink.org
/economicslPublicSubsidiesforSports.html; Ronald D. Utt, Taxpayers Prop Up Sports
Profits (Jul. 30, 2002) (suggesting New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg put city's fiscal
priorities first in deciding not to subsidize new stadiums for New York Yankees and New
York Mets), at http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/
ed073002.cfm.
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undertake such a massive project when they have limited
resources? The reasons for these expenditures can be broken
down into three main groups: job creation, economic stimulation,
and attracting outside industries.155
When stadium construction is undertaken, local politicians
have to justify how public expenditures on behalf of a private
organization will benefit their constituents. 156 This is not a
normal situation where a business receives property tax breaks
or other incentives to move into a community.157 In a stadium
deal there is an actual cash subsidy usually reaching the
hundreds of millions of dollars.158 To calm worries about
overspending, the first justification given is the creation of jobs.
It cannot be questioned that a stadium will create jobs.159 But
further analysis shows that these jobs are usually very low
155 See generally Jensen, supra note 55, at 438 (comparing economically diverse jobs
promised by offering tax incentives to corporations that move to a city to those unskilled,
low-end, seasonal jobs promised by offering tax incentives to build stadiums); Parlow,
supra note 31, at 486 (stating three justifications for public funding: job creation, prestige
and publicity to attract new businesses, and additional tax revenues); Robinson, supra
note 55, at 158 (citing jobs and increased tax revenues as some of promised public benefits
of stadium subsidies).
156 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 485 (explaining advocates of new sports facilities
must convince the public of benefits of building new sports arenas or stadiums); Bandow,
supra note 153, at B01 (describing justifications politicians offer constituents for
stadiums, including municipal prestige, business development, and new jobs); Utt, supra
note 154 (noting that Maryland officials justified stadium subsidies to lure the Browns
from Cleveland to Baltimore by claiming that such subsidies would ultimately stimulate
the local economy).
157 See generally Jensen, supra note 55, at 438 (discussing the differences in economic
effects between corporations and professional sports franchises that receive tax subsidies
to relocate or remain in specific locations); Beth Kassab, Orlando OKs Incentives to Lure
Jet Blue, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 5, 2003, at C1 (reporting Jet Blue Airway's receipt of
$1.7 million in incentives, including property tax rebates, to bring 150 jobs to the Orlando,
Florida area); William Pack, Incentives Method OKed: Entity Created to Issue Bond for
Land Toyota Needs, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 21, 2003, at 8B (describing a tax
incentive package designed to lure a Toyota truck plant to San Antonio, Texas).
158 See Bandow, supra note 153, at B01 (observing in spite of a serious budget crisis,
the Oregon legislature recently approved a $150 million subsidy to build a new baseball
stadium in a bid to win the Expos from Montreal); Jensen, supra note 55, at 425 (noting
Cleveland Indians received $155.7 million in subsidies to build Jacobs Field); Utt, supra
note 154 (stating city of Baltimore provided $210 million in subsidies to construct Camden
Yards for the Baltimore Orioles).
159 See generally Jensen, supra note 55, at 438 (noting stadium construction creates
temporary construction jobs and unskilled, seasonal positions); Robert A. Schmoll,
NAFTA Chapter 11 and Professional Sports in Canada, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1027,
1039 (2003) (stating while new stadiums can create some employment, economists label
public investment in professional sports an ineffective and costly means of job creation);
Sutter, supra note 154 (contrasting proponents' estimates of jobs created by stadium
construction and the number of actual jobs created as reported by follow-up impact
studies).
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paying and low skill jobs. 160 Further, if you look at the
opportunity costs of stadium construction, such large
expenditures could be used to create jobs directly.161 By funding
various programs that develop skills and educate, the local
government can realize a much higher return on its
investment. 162
Stadium funds are also justified by the promise of a stimulated
and vibrant economy - both locally around the stadium, and
generally in the surrounding community.163 But a further look
reveals how little a sports franchise can generate. Most
franchises are a very small percentage of the overall economy in
their local market.164 In fact, even multiple franchises in a given
location cannot create an economic impact. For example, it has
160 See Susan R. Jones, Current Issues in the Changing Roles and Practices of
Community Economic Development Lawyers, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 437, 466 (2002) (noting
jobs created at sports arenas are low-wage jobs insufficient to support families); Jensen,
supra note 55, at 438 (explaining jobs created by stadiums are usually unskilled, low-end,
and seasonal positions); Utt, supra note 154 (arguing stadiums use public money to create
low wage, part-time, seasonal jobs that do little to enhance economic well-being of a city
or its residents).
161 See Noll, supra note 154 (arguing that substituting spending for stadiums on
recreational spending concentrates income, reduces the total number of jobs, and replaces
full-time jobs with part-time low-wage jobs); Utt, supra note 154 (arguing that subsidized
sports stadiums draw public funds away from other city uses and jobs such as new schools
and better law enforcement); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 15; Schmoll, supra note 159
(noting that a stadium is "ineffective and costly");
162 See generally Bast, supra note 35, (arguing stadium subsidies divert public funds
from more important municipal projects); Nader, supra note 153, at B07 (suggesting
funds diverted for a proposed Washington, D.C. stadium to lure the Montreal Expos will
eventually negatively impact city services); Noll, supra note 154 (stating no recent
stadium project that received subsidies appears to have generated reasonable return on
investment).
163 See generally Paul J. Gessing, Public Funding of Sports Stadiums: Ballpark
Boondoggle (Feb. 28, 2001) (noting proponents cite both economic and emotional
arguments for stadium subsidies), at http://www.ntu.org/taxpayerissues/ntufpolicy
_papers/ppntuf_133.php3; Jensen, supra note 55, at 441 (noting those in favor of new
stadium construction consistently claim stadium will bring economic benefits to the host
city in form of new revenues); Noll, supra note 154 (describing economic rationale for
stadium subsidies, including job creation); Allen R. Sanderson, In Defense of New Sports
Stadiums, Ballparks and Arenas, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 173, 176 (2000).
164 See Sanderson, supra note 163, at 174 (suggesting a franchise's economic impact is
"simply too small to matter or to measure with sufficient precision in any econometric
analysis"); see also Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on
S. 952 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 21 (1999) (statement of
Hon. Edith G. Prague, Connecticut State Senate) (opining a stadium has almost no
impact, or even possibly a negative impact on a local economy); Thomas Kupper, A Bolt of
Skepticism; Economists Question Whether Pro Sports Teams Like the Chargers Contribute
Much to the Bottom Line of a Region, SAN-DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 7, 2002, at A-1
(rebutting presumption stadiums have a positive impact on economy with academic
studies finding effects to be much smaller than teams have said: "The studies have found
that sports teams bring little new money into a region because they attract few out-of-
town fans to games and do little if anything to raise overall incomes in a region.").
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been estimated that the nine major sports teams in the New York
City area only account for 0.3% of the regional economy.165 If
this statistic is accurate, the impact of one team is virtually
immeasurable. This is countered with the argument that outside
jobs are created, which cannot be directly linked to a stadium's
impact on the economy. While this may be true, most of these
jobs are in the restaurant and tourism industries, which even the
highest estimates show, only amount to 2-3% of a local
economy. 166 Even assuming there is increased spending in a
particular area due to the presence of a stadium; it is possible
that consumer spending is just shifting. 167 Instead of creating
new dollars coming into the local economy, the stadium is simply
diverting money from other recreational activities. 168 This
165 See Keating, supra note 5, at 18. See generally Raymond J. Keating, It's Time to
Get Government Out of the Sports Business, USA TODAY, Mar. 2000 (estimating cost of
Mayor Giuliani's 1999 scheme calling for new ballparks for Mets and the Yankees, new
minor league stadiums in Brooklyn and Staten Island, a new domed football stadium on
Manhattan's West Side and a new Madison Square Garden for the NBA Knicks and NHL
Rangers at $5,000,000,000); Goodman, supra note 9, at 202 (pondering The New York
City Comptroller's Offices' employment of a multiplier based on fan spending at local
businesses to justify the Yankees (MLB), Mets (MLB), Rangers (NHL), Islanders (NHL),
Devils (NHL), Knicks (NBA), Nets (NBA), Giants (NFL), and Jets (NFL) accounting for $
1.15 billion in annual economic activity in New York City region).
166 See ROSENTRAUB, supra note 1, at 149-50 (stating of this 2% to 3% of economy
tourism industries account for, actual effect of a stadium will only increase these
industries' impact by a tiny fraction if at all, making this affect on overall economy
minute); see also Senkiewicz, supra note 58, at 588 (citing David Lonergan's proposition
that for every $1 million spent on professional sports, seventy-six jobs are created). See
generally Gasper, supra note 30, at 363 (pointing to sports economists' studies noting jobs
created by stadium, which include jobs to construct stadium and jobs to maintain
stadium, sell concessions, etc., are generally low-paying and temporary, and consequently,
do not have a large impact upon municipality's tax base).
167 See Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 47 (1999) (statement of Dr.
Mark S. Rosentraub, Professor and Associate Dean, School of Public and Environment
Affairs at Indiana University in Indianapolis) (opining "[t]here is no evidence a team's
presence generates economic development for a region. Sports facilities largely reshuffle
existing spending for recreation among activities in a region."); see also Bast, supra note
35 (arguing construction of a new stadium does not suddenly expand a consumer's
spending power, it simply shifts spending of entertainment money from another venue to
new stadium). See generally Clayton P. Gillette, Symposium, The Law and Economics of
Federalism: Business Incentives, Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82
MINN. L. REV. 447, 477 (1997) (citing sports stadium subsidies as perfect examples of
expenditures that suffer from miscalculation of benefits, susceptibility to agency costs,
and deadweight losses).
168 See Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 37 (1999) (statement of Dr.
Andrew Zimbalist, Professor of Economics, Smith College) (explaining new sports
facilities do not generate any or "new value-added" money in a region); see also Goodman,
supra note 9, at 202-03 (concluding stadiums in a region, "realigns, rather than increases
leisure spending."). But see Baim, supra note 20, at 448 (reasoning that [franchise]
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creates little economic stimulus and a very poor return on the
investment in a stadium.
The final argument espoused in favor of publicly funded
stadiums is the attraction of outsiders into the community.169
This argument is advanced on two different levels. Some studies
say it will attract visitors into the community which will create
an increase in tourism.170 The problem with this rationale is
that new stadiums are independent entertainment complexes.
Even if a large portion of non-residents enter the community they
are unlikely to spend more money because they have all the
essential products, such as food and merchandise, at the
stadium.171 Also, it has been noted that even if the hospitality
industries like restaurants and hotels did benefit, they are too
small a percentage of the overall economy to have any significant
effect.172
The other argument supporting the theory that a stadium will
attract outsiders relates to corporate residents. Some feel that
luring a professional sports team into a community will increase
the community's attractiveness to industry.173 However, if this is
relocations from city core to nearby communities will reduce economic activity in vacated
downtown areas, and increase economic activity in the suburbs).
169 See David S. Caudill, From Blueprints to Bricks: A Survey of Current Baseball
Stadium Financing Projects, 34 URB. LAW. 331, 332 (2002) (noting interests of local
governments in attracting tourists and job opportunities); Richard M. Perlmutter, From
Blueprints to Bricks: A Survey of Current Baseball Stadium Financing Projects: Boston,
34 URB. LAw. 335, 337 (2002) (discussing "rosy projections" of a new stadium in Boston).
See generally Bhasin, supra note 41, at 199 (citing economists who have likened the effect
of building a sports stadium in state or political subdivision to that of adding a major
department store or a small university to economy of the community).
170 See Adams, supra note 5, at 676 (discussing Massachusetts legislative findings that
a stadium would increase tourism revenue); Goodman, supra note 9, at 195-96 (noting a
number of stadiums are funded with taxes on hotels and rental cars, which can have a
negative effect on tourism).
171 See Bast, supra note 35, at 10 (referring to modern stadiums as, "self-contained
fortresses, with restaurants, gift shops, hotel rooms, and even night clubs"); see also Build
Them and They'll Come, ESTATE'S GAZ. (London), Aug. 19, 2000, at 50 (discussing 'super-
stadiums' that incorporate hotels, restaurants, and shops); Perfect Pitch, MARKETING
WEEK, Mar. 29, 2001, at 65 (pointing out most stadiums being built will have corporate
entertaining facilities, including restaurants, lounges and perhaps syndicate rooms for
meetings and conferences).
172 See ROSENTRAUB, supra note 1, at 149-50.
173 See Bast, supra note 35, at 6 (discussing argument that stadiums attract business
to a community); Smith, supra note 12, at 47 (noting the argument that a stadium is a
"magnet" for outside business). But see Lee Leonard, Tax-Break Deals are Discounted as
Job-Makers, COLOMBUS. DIsP., Apr. 24, 1996, at 2B (quoting David Swindell, a professor
of urban affairs at Wright State University) (proffering his theory that major league cities
do not attract businesses because of their sports but because of their operating conditions,
qualified work force, airports and transportation systems).
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a goal of the local government, there are many more direct ways
to attract industry than by building a sports facility. Local
governments can offer property tax breaks or other special
incentives that are less costly and can directly create new
jobs.174 This job creation could bring new money into the
economy, instead of just recycling the old.175 Additionally, the
availability of a professional sports franchise will have little if
any relevance in a company's decision to relocate. 176 The
economic factors of a community, including labor costs, will be
weighted much more heavily than the availability of a
professional sports franchise. 177 A city could invest in giving
corporate tax breaks or other incentives that would greatly
174 See Robert J. Desiderio et al., New Mexico Taxes: Taking Another Look, 32 N.M. L.
REV. 351, 372-73 (2002) (discussing tax breaks given by New Mexico Legislature to
corporations to retain jobs or create additional employment); see also Heidi Sarah Wicker,
Making a Run for the Border: Should the United States Stem Runaway Film and
Television Production Through Tax and Other Financial Incentives, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L
L. REV. 461, 488-95 (2003) (focusing on use of tax incentives to bring production back to
United States to spur economy). See generally Deborah S. DiPiero, Puerto Rico's Need for
Corporate Incentives Following the 1996 Amendment to Section 936, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J.
549, 559-61 (1997) (discussing Puerto Rico's economic reliance on corporate tax
incentives).
175 See Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 47 (1999) (statement of Dr.
Mark S. Rosentraub, Professor and Associate Dean, School of Public and Environment
Affairs at Indiana University in Indianapolis); see also Oram, supra note 110, at 198
(acknowledging proponents claim public subsidization of new stadiums sets "multiplier
effect" into motion, as increased local income in turn creates more new spending and more
new jobs) (emphasis added).
176 See ROSENTRAUB, supra note 1, at 151 (noting that cost of labor is most important
factor in a business relocation, while availability of a sports franchise is not considered
relevant); see also Bast, supra note 35, at 10 (arguing it is absurd that a CEO of a Fortune
500 company would even factor in the proximity of professional sports in making a
decision to relocate a business). See generally Edwin R. Render, Can Tort Law Be Used to
Save Blue Collar Jobs in the United States?, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 175, 175-81 (citing
improved access to raw materials, proximity to customers, and cost of labor as factors
contributing to relocation decisions).
177 See Sepulveda, supra note 25, at 146-47 (noting how Maryland created jobs using
special economic incentives at a much cheaper rate than a new stadium provided); see also
Erickson, supra note 109, at 632-33 (examining need for a federal fix to "race for the
bottom", based on fears that because of competition between local governments for scarce
resources, including professional franchises, local governments will continually force one
another to offer greater and greater incentives to industry, to point where local
governments hurt themselves and no longer benefit from the industry they attract); Steve
Massey, North Star, the Twin Cities, and Pittsburgh Are A Lot Alike. So Why Has
Minneapolis-St. Paul Created Four Times As Many Jobs In the 90's?, PIrrr. POST-GAZErrE,
May 18, 1997, at H7 (describing how a "top-notch" school system is a major factor in
attracting industry).
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benefit both the local economy and community more than a new
stadium.17 8
VI. ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF REVENUE
The tension in the stadium financing debate is centered on an
owner's lack of capital to fully fund a stadium.179 Due to this
lack of revenue, owners seek outside contributions, which leads
local governments into making their funds available.180 One
solution to the stadium construction debate is to attract third
parties to invest. 181 One of the most significant and successful
examples of this is Pacific Bell Park in San Francisco. Pac Bell
178 See Sepulveda, supra note 25, at 146-47 (discussing economic incentives used by
the state of Maryland to benefit the local economy). See generally Leslie Reed, Corporate
Taxes to Fill Budget Gap: Gov. Johanns and the Revenue Committee Are Working on a
Surcharge or a Filing Change to Make up $35 Million, OMAHA WORLD NEWS, Mar. 12,
2002, at 1A (discussing tax credits given to corporations that expand in the state of
Nebraska); Tony Munroe, Study: Corporate Tax Breaks Yield Marginal Benefits, BOS.
HER., Mar. 5, 1996, at 018 (quoting Robert Tannenwald, author of a study on corporate
tax incentives) (stating that "[b]usiness tax incentives are an uncertain tool of economic
development.").
179 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 488-89 (noting a franchise's lack of capital to fully
fund a stadium); see also Steven Pearlstein, Major League Baseball's D.C. Playoffs, WASH.
POST, Jun. 27, 2003 (discussing relationship between franchise price and financing of new
stadiums); Mt. Clemens Needs More Answers Before Approving Ballpark, DET. NEWS, Apr.
10, 2003, at 14A (examining a financing scheme where if team failed to succeed
financially, the stadium would revert back to the city).
180 See Schmoll, supra note 159, at 1027 (stating "local governments in the United
States have invested heavily in professional sports franchises by building stadiums and
arenas, hoping either to prevent the home team from moving out or to entice someone
else's home team to move in."); see also Curtis Eichelberger, Filling the Emptiness:
Stadiums Host Weddings, Concerts as Sports Franchises Seek Cash, HOUS. CHRON., June
22, 2003, at Sports 1 (pointing out The Cardinals under owner Bill Bidwill, the Cowboys
owned by Jerry Jones and Lions owned by Bill Ford Jr., chairman of Ford Motor Co. and
other family members, pitched for local governments to help pay for [stadium projects] by
selling bonds or giving them grants by arguing multiple-use stadiums would generate
new tax revenue and economic development); Nicholas D. Kristof, Governor Bush's
Journey: Breaking Into Baseball, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000, at 1 (suggesting George W.
Bush and his fellow owners got local government to seize property of other landowners
and, in effect, hand it over to Texas Rangers so they could make a profit on it, as well as
negotiated a huge public investment in The Ballpark at Arlington).
181 See Senkiewicz, supra note 58, at 601 (opining professional sports is a very
successful private industry, not in need of massive public subsidies, and as such, steps
must be taken to ensure that stadium financing is accomplished through mainly private
means, thus eliminating professional sports as a welfare recipient); see also Al Lewis,
Pepsi Center Financing in Place; Revenue-Backed Securities Raised Nearly $ 140 Million,
All From Private Investors, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver), July 31, 1998, at 1B (illustrating
benefits accorded to private investors, such as Ascent Entertainment Group, financiers of
the Pepsi Center, who will receive an economic development package that includes
infrastructure improvements and property tax deferments). But see Parlow, supra note
31, at 513-15 (proffering argument that if a new sports facility were not subsidized, the
interest and amortization for the arena or stadium would be too expensive for any private
investor to afford with the anticipation of making the investment profitable).
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opened at the beginning of the 2000 season as the home field for
the San Francisco Giants.182 This stadium was a successful
private venture by China Basin Ballpark Corp., a subsidiary of
the Giants and private investors.18 3 China Basin secured a loan
for $170 million, and solicited Pacific Bell, a regional telephone
company, for $50 million in naming rights.184 They also received
other corporate sponsorship totaling $61 million. 8 5 The city of
San Francisco contributed an estimated $15-20 million indirectly
through its redevelopment agency for infrastructure
improvements around the park.186 The owners then used the
Personal Seat Licensing (PSL) technique to secure another $70
million.18 7 The entire estimated cost of $306 million was raised
182 See Dan Krauss, Elster's 3 Homers Help Dodgers Win 1st Game at Pacific Bell
Park, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000 at 132 (noting Giants won their first game played
at Pac Bell Park); Evelyn Nieves, Opening Day for Big Wallets and a New Stadium, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000 at A26 (rehashing previous day's opening festivities); James Rainey,
Debut of a Glittering New Diamond: Baseball: Rents Are Soaring Near Giants' Pac Bell
Park, As Is San Francisco Civic Pride, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2000, at Al (discussing
opening day around Pac Bell park). Pac Bell Park has since undergone a name change to
SBC Park due to the acquisition of Pacific Bell by SBC Communications.
183 See Patrick Reusse, Pac Bell Brouhaha; Owner Needs Ego Massage, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis), Oct. 23, 2002, at 1C (stating Pac Bell was first privately financed major
league baseball stadium since Dodger Stadium); Larry Stone, Pac Bell's Splendor Years
From Stick's, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at DI (noting stadium was built entirely with
$335 million of private funds); Ballparks, Ballparks.com (discussing financing strategy of
Pac Bell park), available at http://www.ballparks.com baseballlnational/pacbel.htm (last
visited Feb. 3, 2004).
184 See Edward Epstein, Name's a Big Deal for Giants, Pac Bell, SAN FRAN. CHRON.,
Apr. 4, 1996, at A13 (explaining importance of naming deal for marketing purposes); Jeff
Pelline, Pacific Bell, Giants Strike Deal for Park $50 Million for Right to Name New
Stadium, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Apr. 3, 1996, at Al (detailing Giants and Pacific Bell's
stadium deal); National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School, Sports
Facility Reports, Appendix 1 Vol. 3 No. 2 [hereinafter MLB Sports Facility Reports]
(charting stadium financing plan), available at http://law.marquette.edu
/s3/site/imageslsportsMLB32.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
185 See Carol Emert, Anheuser is $35 Million Pac Bell Sponsor, SAN FRAN. CHRON.,
May 23, 1997, at B1 (listing Anheuser-Bush as corporate sponsor); see also Mary Wade
Burnside, Catchy Commercial Helps Stoke MasterCard, MLB Sponsorships; Auds &
Arenas, AMUSEMENT BUS., Dec. 3 2001, at 10 (observing San Francisco Giants have
corporate sponsorships with both MasterCard and Visa); MLB Sports Facility Reports,
supra note 184 (noting various components of facility financing).
186 See Christopher Carey, Two Privately Financed Stadiums May Hold Lessons For
Cardinals; Homes of Patriots and Giants Have Features That Cut Risk, Saved Money, ST.
LOUIS DISPATCH, Sept. 29, 2002, at A6 (noting Bay Area voters rejected measures to
provide public funding to the stadium, but city was able to contribute $15 million for
infrastructure improvements); Goodman, supra note 9, at 221 (estimating public
contribution at $26 million); MLB Sports Facility Reports, supra note 184, at 13
(estimating public contribution to be $15 million).
187 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 221 (accounting for more than $70 million in funds
from seat licenses and club seats); MLB Sports Facility Reports, supra note 184, at 13
(listing charter seats as part of facility funding); see also Richard Alm, The Cost of New
Parks, Paying Nosebleed Prices; Fans Appear Willing to Pay More Money, SEATTLE TIMES,
1018 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:3
through these various techniques, and more notably did not
require any extra expenditure by the local government.18 8
Some believed this privately financed stadium would mark the
end of a great baseball tradition because the team's revenue
stream would be harmed. To the contrary, the team has
prospered since the new stadium, with sell-outs for nearly every
game, one of the league's higher payrolls, and advancing to the
World Series in 2002.189 The Giant's organization has shown
what a successful blend of private financing and team
contribution can create.
A. Corporate Naming Rights
As San Francisco has proven, there are other alternatives to
publicly funded stadiums. The combination of private investment
and team contribution can create a successful stadium and
team. 190 There are several alternatives emerging as alternative
sources of revenue to fund a stadium construction. The San
Francisco development utilized one of these profitable and
growing trends in sports today, corporate naming rights. 191
July 18, 2000, at D5 (observing fans need to pay high ticket prices to cover investments in
new stadiums).
188 See Carey, supra note 186, at A6 (observing that park was built with private funds
due to lack of public funds); Goodman, supra note 9, at 221 (discussing various techniques
used to raise funds); Joe Holleman, Giants' Ballpark and its Eclectic Neighborhood Cover
All the Bases, ST. LouIs DISPATCH, Oct. 12, 2002, at 14 (stating $306 million projects was
built almost entirely with private funds).
189 See Major League Baseball Payrolls, USA TODAY, Nov. 13, 2002, at C9 (showing
San Francisco Giant's payroll increasing in 2002 by 18% from 2001); see also Rafael
Hermoso, Giants Make it a Wild Card World Series, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2002, at D1
(discussing Giants making it to 2002 World Series); Giants Sign Cruz, Name him Starting
Right Fielder, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 29, 2003, at D8 (noting Giants' payroll is at $75
million).
190 See Charles Bricker, NFL Knows About Building; Expansion Contrasts With
Contraction and Ballpark Woes, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), Nov. 9, 2001, at 6C
(quoting NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue) ("We believe new stadiums in our existing
cities are a good thing for everybody - teams, fans and communities."). But see Bob
Weimer, A Jets Stadium Offers Suffolk No Bargain, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Mar. 13, 2000, at
A26 (concluding new stadiums do no produce economic growth in metropolitan areas). See
generally Darrell Williams, State-of-the-Art Arena is Focus of Benson's Financial Strategy;
He Links Projects to Revitalizing of Urban Corridor, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
June 27, 2001, at 1 (finding even with private investment and NFL loans, securing
additional money needed from public can be very difficult).
191 See W.S. Miller, Sports Facilities and Development: "What Do You Mean My
Facility is Obsolete?" How 21st Century Technology Could Change Sports Facility
Development, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 335, 343 (2000) (observing that naming rights and
sub-naming rights are lucrative ways to obtain sponsorship dollars); Media Market -
Sport Plays the Naming Game, MEDIA WEEK, Dec. 17, 1999, at 8 (discussing benefits of
naming rights to corporate sponsor); see also What's in a Stadium's Name?, SPORTS
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The San Francisco Giants received $50 million from Pacific
Bell to acquire the naming rights to the stadium.192 In more
recent events, Reliant paid $300 million for naming rights of the
home of the new NFL franchise in Houston to be named Reliant
Park.193 In Maryland, just outside Washington D.C., the
Washington Redskins entered into a contract with Federal
Express for a $205 million, 27-year deal. 194 These partnerships
with corporations provide the essential third party to invest in
such a large project. 195 They also prevent local governments
from expending funds they simply do not have. The team also
benefits from a naming agreement. 196 Instead of taking on debt
to finance a stadium, which could harm revenues until the debt is
paid, this is a two-way transaction. The team gets a stadium,
MARKETING, Apr. 18, 2001, at 7 (commenting on problems caused by stadium name
changes).
192 See Nieves, supra note 182, at A26 (stating utility company paid $50 million to
have its name on new park); Justin Pope, Firms Still Pay to Name Stadiums; Stock
Market Instability isn't Scaring Them Away; Sponsorship on a Grand Scale, MARKETING
NEWS TM, Jan. 15, 2001, at 24 (noting in 1996, Pacific Bell paid $50 million for naming
rights); MLB Sports Facility Reports, supra note 184, at 13 (discussing Pac Bell stadium's
naming rights).
193 See Eric Berger, Naming Stadium Site Like a Walk in the (Reliant) Park, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 27, 2000, at Al (stating Reliant's naming deal at $300 million is the biggest
deal of all time); Joseph Duarte, What's in a Name?, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 18, 2002, at
15 (discussing deal which also covers the Astrodome and several other stadiums in the
complex, including the retractable domed stadium for the new Houston Texans); see also
John McClain, McNair Confident About Reliant, HOUSTON CHRON., May 15, 2002, at 4
(assuring Reliant's $300 million naming deal will not be affected by the ongoing
investigation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).
194 See Berger, supra note 193, at Al (remarking prior to Reliant's naming deal,
Federal Express's naming deal with Washington's Redskins was the largest in history);
ESPN.com, Sportsbusiness-Stadium Naming Rights (listing $7.5 million as average
yearly amount paid by Federal Express to Washington Redskins), at
http://espn.go.comsportsbusiness/s/stadiumnames.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004); see also
National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law School, Sports Facility
Reports, App. 3 Vol. 3 No. 2, p.1 7 (2002) [hereinafter NFL Sports Facility Reports] (noting
stadium was almost entirely privately financed with only public contributions going to
improve infrastructure around stadium), available at http:/Iaw.marquette.eduls3/
site/images/sports/nfl32.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
195 See Bhasin, supra note 41, at 190-91 (discussing various finance strategies,
including corporate sponsorship, to cover the increasingly large cost of building
professional sports stadiums); Fraas, supra note 55, at 228 (noting in 1998 average
naming rights for new professional football and baseball stadiums sold for an average of
$50 million over twenty-five years).
196 See Jean Bonham, Corporation Stadium? Not Such a Bad Idea, ROCKY MTN. NEWS
(Denver), July 12, 1998, at 15G (speculating a naming agreement revenue could help
Denver Broncos recover from loss of John Elway); Fraas, supra note 55, at 220
(commenting without proper financing, professional teams may have to relocate); see also
Richard Alm, It's a New Ballgame in Naming Rights, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 25,
2003, at iF (discussing how naming agreements benefits both corporate sponsor and
team).
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:3
while the corporation receives valuable advertising to a large
portion of the community. By creating this two-way system of
benefits, the team can protect its existing revenue and use any
increases from a new stadium to re-invest in personnel on the
field. 197
B. League Contribution
Another means of privately financing a stadium is through a
league-sponsored program. In 1999 the NFL took a pro-active
approach to stadium finance and realized that a source of capital
from a third party was needed.198 The league adopted resolution
G-3, which will contribute between 34% and 50% of the cost of a
stadium on a case-by-case basis.199 The money will come
partially from the team and partially from league revenue. 200
The league's contribution comes from the most recent $17.6
billion television contract. 201 Because this is a steady source of
income for the league until 2006 it can commit to this program
197 See Berger, supra note 193, at Al (explaining under Reliant's naming deal, the
NFL franchise team will receive about 75% of $10 million Reliant will be paying yearly);
Holleman, supra note 188, at 14 (stating Giants' revenue from corporate sponsorships
enables them to "afford Barry Bonds and a formidable crew to surround him."); see also
Emert, supra note 185, at B1 (articulating Anheuser-Busch will pay $35 million over ten
years to be a corporate sponsor of the Giants).
198 See Oram, supra note 110, at 193 (noting NFL created a stadium financing plan to
help prevent franchises from relocating by loaning them substantial money upfront); see
also Cosmo Macero, Jr., Mass. Plan Worth a Good Deal More, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 30,
1999, at 45 (asserting NFL's stadium financing provision will enable the New England
Patriots to build a new stadium for as little as $125 million out-of pocket); see also Kevin
Seifert, Extension is Possible For Stadium Financing, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Mar.
20, 2003, at 2C (commenting $650 million has been funded by the NFL to help build or
renovate stadiums).
199 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 220 (explaining G-3 resolution takes visiting team's
revenue and places it into a fund for stadium construction that allows large market teams
to use fund for a maximum of 50% of cost of stadium); see also Brian Allee-Walsh, NFL
Offers Stadium Loans; Benson Could Receive up to $100 million, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Nov. 17, 2000, at 14 (explaining under G-3 Resolution, NFL teams can receive
NFL backing capped at $150 million for stadiums in top six markets and $100 million for
those below that level); Macero, supra note 198, at 45 (quoting a president of a sports
financing company as stating G-3 provision is "a loan that really doesn't ever get repaid").
200 See Stadium Financing and Franchise Relocation Act of 1999: Hearing on S. 952
Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 92 (1999) (resolution G-3 § 4)
(detailing proposed arrangement for stadium financing).
201 See 106th Cong. 92 (1999) (resolution G-3 § 4) (indicating amount of league's
television contract); see also Peter King, From Tags to Riches, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan.
23, 1998) (detailing league's television contract), available at http://sports
illustrated.cnn.com/football/nfl/superbowl/32/news/1998/01/23/king_0123/kingsupe.html.
See generally Rick Harrow, Clarett and NFL Eligibility: Some Legal, Business
Perspectives (Sept. 30, 2003) (arguing league's television contract is instrumental for
stadium financing), at http://cbs.sportsline.com/general/story/6690272.
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without worry of economic downturns. 202 The G-3 program has
been utilized for several stadiums, including the new football
stadium in Philadelphia, which opened in the 2003 season. 203
The Philadelphia stadium is almost 80% privately financed, due
in large part to league and team contributions that totaled $310
million. 204 This program can be a valuable asset to not only a
team looking to build a stadium, but a city debating how much
public money should be spent. Other professional sports leagues
should consider instituting programs similar to the G-3 program,
especially if a lucrative television deal is in place.
C. Personal Seating Licenses
Another third party revenue source is the fans that actually
benefit from the stadium. For many recent stadium
constructions, personal seating licenses (PSLs) have been sold.
This license allows an individual fan to pay a fixed price to obtain
the right to a seat in the stadium. 205 For each game at the
stadium, the PSL holder is notified and has a chance to purchase
the tickets before anyone else.206 If a PSL holder no longer wants
to continue purchasing these tickets they can opt out of the
202 See Rick Westhead, NFL Won't Exercise Option to Reopen Contract with TV
Networks, STAR TRIB. (Minn.), Feb. 8, 2003 (noting NFL's option to opt out of current
television contract, but league decided not to exercise this right causing contract to run
until 2006); see also Paul Tagliabue, Remarks at the Economic Club of Washington (Dec.
11, 1996) (commenting on league's decision to retain its contract), at
http://www.economicclub.org/Pages/archive/fulltextiarch-tagliabue.htm.
203 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 220 (noting that Philadelphia, New England, and
Denver took advantage of league program); see also Plan for Two Stadiums Passes in
Philadelphia, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Dec. 21, 2000, at 2C (commenting on
Philadelphia's new stadium).
204 See NFL Sports Facility Reports, supra note 152, at 13 (indicating total amount of
league's contribution); see also Jeff Young, Eagles Hope to be Worthy of New Home: Set to
Open in 2003, Lincoln Field a Huge Improvement Over Vet, INTELLIGENCER J. (Lancaster,
PA), Jul. 17, 2002, at C-1 (detailing percentage of private financing at Lincoln Financial
Field). See generally Eagles and Phillies to Get New Homes, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at
D7 (indicating financial underpinnings of Lincoln Financial Field).
205 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 503 (stating this type of financing started in 1971
during construction of Texas Stadium in Dallas); see also 72,000 PSLS say the NFL was
wrong, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 9, 1995, at 1D (detailing success of stadium
seating licenses). See generally John Patterson, Stadium Seat Licenses a Personal Issue,
CHIC. DAILY HERALD, Dec. 1, 2000, at 10 (indicating details of seating licenses).
206 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 189 n.64 (discussing dynamics of Personal Seating
Licenses); see also Oakland Football Marketing Association Prorates Price of Personal
Seat Licenses to 60 percent of Original Cost, Bus. WIRE, Apr. 28, 2000 (commenting on
relationship between seating licenses and stadium funding). See generally Mark Stewart,
UWBoard to Consider Seat-License Measure, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 1999, at 9
(detailing effects of seating licenses on overall franchise revenue).
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agreement or sell the license to a third party.207 Consequently,
in some cases reselling a PSL can be very profitable. 208 For
teams with a strong fan base of season ticket holders this can be
a very lucrative revenue source. In San Francisco, the Giants
raised almost $70 million from PSL's alone. 209
PSL's are a fair and successful way of raising large amounts of
capital. They allow the beneficiaries of the stadium, the fans, to
contribute to the cost. For this contribution they receive a
valuable license. This two-sided transaction is a balanced
approach with both sides benefiting, unlike the one sided
transaction of a city contributing money and getting little back in
return. 210
D. Luxury Suites
Another form of third party investment is a luxury suite.211
Typically corporations will be the ideal consumers due to the
high cost and large number of people involved. Usually a suite
holds 15-20 people and has its own bathroom, living room style
seating, and is enclosed from the elements by a glass window.
Luxury suites in the NFL can range in price from $50,000 to well
over $100,000.212 The benefit of the luxury suites is not just the
large amount of revenue they generate, but that they are
normally purchased for more than just one season, creating
207 See Fraas, supra note 55, at 223 (stating a PSL can be sold at any time).
208 See Ralph C. Anzivino, Reorganization of the Professional Sports Franchise, 12
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 53 (2001) (discussing how valuable a PSL can be). See generally
Stewart, supra note 206 (discussing University of Wisconsin's plans for PSL's).
209 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 221 (indicating use of PSL's in San Francisco); see
also Greg Gatlin, San Fran's Pitch Pays Off, BOSTON HERALD, May 25, 1999, at 30
(detailing success of private funding in San Francisco).
210 See Anzivino, supra note 208, at 47 (indicating benefits of a balanced approach to
stadium financing); see also Haudricourt, supra note 209 (detailing success of a balanced
approach in San Francisco).
211 See Anzivino, supra note 208 at 48 (detailing the effects of luxury suites); see also
Ben Brown, Luxury Suite: Business Tool, USA TODAY, Sept. 21, 1993, at 9C (arguing
benefits of luxury suites); Christopher Lopez, Elite Seat: Luxury Boxes Where Big Bucks
Are, DENVER POST, Aug. 14, 1994, at A-13 (indicating use of successful luxury suites).
212 See Houston Texans Luxury Press Suite Information Brochure (advertising luxury
suites in Reliant Stadium for $100,000, and special incentives for making a six, eight, or
ten year commitment), available at http://www.houstontexans.com/photosl
PressSuiteInsertsll2i02.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2004); see also Valerie Lister, Owners
Fill Up On Rising Revenue from Luxury Suites, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 1994, at 10C
(detailing the amenities of luxury suites). See generally Gerry Dulac, The Necessity for
Luxury, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2001, at 11 (commenting on opulence of luxury
suites).
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stable income no matter the economic climate.213 Also, initial
payments can be obtained before stadium construction is
underway due to the increasing demand for these suites, thereby
generating construction revenue. 214
Both luxury suites and PSL's are significant sources of fan-
based revenue for most teams today.215 The advantage of both is
the considerable amount of revenue that is obtained before
construction even begins. Along with the fan based revenue
sources, any third party, such as a corporation or professional
sports league, should be considered to avoid public expenditures.
By utilizing outside sources of revenue the pressure placed on
local governments to contribute is decreased. Additionally, by
allowing fans and other outsiders to contribute, the burden is
shifted to the true beneficiaries of the stadium.
VII.CHANGES IN STADIUM FINANCE THROUGH TAX REFORM
Some type of reform is needed in the area of stadium financing.
One initial point to realize in developing a process of reform is
that stadium financing is very unique in each occurrence. There
can be no rigid rules with multiple requirements to get the
optimal result in every situation. Rather, a system should be
developed that creates incentives to act in a certain way. The
goal is to encourage fiscal responsibility and shift the burden to
those who benefit most from a stadium. Not only must the
system itself be flexible, but also each individual plan must be
designed to encounter changing revenue streams, and economic
downturns in both the sports industry and the local or national
economy. This flexibility for stadium finance can be achieved
through changing the Internal Revenue Code to encourage and
shape behavior, not control.
213 See Bowling, supra note 3, at 680 (characterizing PSL revenue as "money out of
thin air").
214 See Parlow, supra note 31, at 504 (noting how PSL and luxury suite revenue do not
count against the 10% tests to determine tax treatment of construction bonds, thereby
allowing this money to help pay off the construction of a stadium). See generally Anzivino,
supra note 208, at 48 (stating luxury suites are second to only television revenue as
revenue generator).
215 See Anzivino, supra note 208, at 47-54 (detailing extensive use of PSLs and luxury
suites); Goodman, supra note 9, at 188-89 (acknowledging luxury suites and PSLs are a
major source of revenue for owners).
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Before any public money is committed to a stadium project,
private sector capital sources should be utilized. As mentioned,
stadium naming rights, league contribution programs, and
private investment are all possible sources. 216 Once these third
party sources have been exhausted, team contribution should be
the next goal. By requiring a franchise owner to contribute to the
cost of construction, while allowing them to keep a majority of
stadium revenue, ensures a system of accountability. 217 The
franchise owner is taking the risk that a team will not succeed on
the field, by agreeing to make payments on the debt each year.
To do this the owner will have more of an incentive to ensure the
stadium revenue will exist to cover these expenditures. If a team
struggles on the field, the stadium revenue will decline. This
creates a different incentive than what currently exists today. In
this scenario the team owner has an incentive to win, but also
just as powerful of an incentive not to simply line his or her
pockets with the value from the stadium. This pressure not to
lose can place more accountability on the franchise owner's
economic decisions. 2 18
Shifting the risk of loss due to a team's failure to the owner is
justified.219 The franchise owner is the person ultimately making
personnel decisions affecting the on field success. It naturally
follows that there should be some consequence to a bad decision.
Repositioning this risk creates a check on the ownership of a
franchise and protects cities from bearing the burden of an under
216 See Anzivino, supra note 208, at 47-59 (detailing various methods of financing);
Goodman, supra note 9, at 224-25 (including naming rights as an important source of
private stadium funding).
217 See Anzivino, supra note 208, at 12-15 (indicating accountability benefits of private
as opposed to public reorganization); Goodman, supra note 9, at 224-25 (recommending
stadium subsidies should come from those who enjoy benefits of stadium).
218 See generally Rick Horrow, Across America, Cities Dream (Lucrative) Stadium
Dreams, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Feb. 4, 1998, at 25A (explaining teams with
significant stadium revenues are winning teams); Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene; Take
Me Out to the Ballgame, But Don't Make Taxpayers Build the Ballpark. The High Cost
and Low Benefit of Sports Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2002, at C2 (proposing owners
who pay billions in players' salaries are in better position to finance stadiums rather than
utilizing public money to subsidize such facilities); David Markiewicz, Falcons' Dome Deal
No Longer So Sweet; Multiyear Lease Hasn't Aged Well, ATL. J. AND CONST., Jan. 14,
2002, at 8A (stating Falcons need to win more games to improve attendance, thus raising
revenue).
219 See generally Glenn Dickey, New Parks No Answer For Sagging Crowds, SAN FRAN.
CHRON., Jul. 6, 2002, at C2 (stating owners are under pressure to produce winning teams
for people to actually pay to see games); J. F. O'Toole, Holding Up Our End, PITT. POST-
GAZETTE, Feb. 14, 1999, at D3 (expressing how public desires for franchise owners to
provide winning teams when it is public funds being used to finance stadiums).
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performing team. A city is also protected from a franchise owner
using the stadium to simply add to his or her wealth.
Once private sources and the franchise itself have contributed,
a city or state will likely be the next source. 220 In some instances
public expenditures can be a positive investment. 22 1 A city can
give relief from property taxes, donate land, or provide funds to
upgrade infrastructure. 222 The key is for local leaders to realize
that any expenditure is an investment, not a complete subsidy.
Community leaders should restrain themselves from committing
huge amounts of capital to fund a project alone. One way to
encourage fiscal responsibility of this nature is to create
incentives to conform to this policy.
The federal government can shape behavior through federal
tax legislation. 223 It is through this legislation that Congress can
promote certain policies, while still maintaining a flexible
system. The legislation should merely offer benefits if conformed
with, but no extreme penalty for non-compliance. 224 It is this
220 See Dave George, Baseball-Happy Boston Fits Fanciful Henry, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
11, 2003, at 5C (exhibiting one team's view that public funding of stadiums is necessary);
Parlow, supra note 31, at 489 (noting need for outside contribution falling on local
government because franchise can not afford entire cost of new facility).
221 See Goodman, supra note 9, at 207-08 (arguing in some instances stadiums can
produce a positive return on a local government's investment); Parlow, supra note 31, at
507-08 (noting several circumstances that can make a stadium a profitable investment for
a municipality). But see Richard P. Cole, Law, Sports, and Popular Culture: The Marriage
of a Relationship Scorned, 23 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 431, 448 (2002) (explaining expected
benefits of a stadium are either much smaller or do not materialize).
222 See MLB Sports Facility Reports, supra note 184, at 13 (noting San Francisco's
small contribution to Pac Bell Stadium for infrastructure); see also Robert Bacon, Initial
Public Offerings and Professional Sports Teams: The Regulations Work, But Are Owners
and Investors Listening?, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 139, 164 (2000) (explaining how
Maryland provided $400 million of stadium funding for Camden Yards through sale of
lottery tickets).
223 See Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX
REV. 645, 654-57 (2003) (explaining how tax laws do not just raise revenue for the federal
government, but also shape behavior); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and
Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1653 (1999) (hypothesizing types of
taxes which would and would not have effect on behavior); Jennifer L. Venghaus,
Comment, Tax Incentives: A Means of Encouraging Research and Development for
Homeland Security?, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1220 (2003) (noting how tax code can
change society's behavior).
224 See David Conn, Section 89 Foes Glad for Delay, J. COMMERCE, Sept. 5, 1989, at 9A
(showing how some sections of tax laws are so complex that costs of determining
compliance may be higher than penalties for failing to comply); Planned Law Will
Penalise Moral Right' to Avoid Tax, EVENING POST (Wellington), Apr. 22, 1996, at
Business 11 (expressing view that tax benefits should only be taken away, and no
penalties imposed for non-compliance with certain new tax law being discussed). See
generally Kang Beng Hoe, Call for Formal Advance Ruling System, BUS. TIMES
(Malaysia), Sept. 11, 2003, at 4 (explaining proposal of advanced tax ruling system in
1026 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:3
framework that can be used to reform the process of stadium
finance.
The first thing that should be undertaken is eliminating bonds
issued for stadium construction from § 141 of the Internal
Revenue Code (I.R.C.). 225 In doing so, this would eliminate the
10% private security test, which does not allow the stadium to
fund itself.226 Exemption from § 141 would permit a local
government to issue bonds, but allow stadium revenue to fund
the bond repayment. If public contributions were issued for
stadium construction, bonds issued for the project would have
tax-exempt interest. However, Congress should not let this go
completely uninhibited. A cap should be imposed on the amount
of tax-exempt bonds that can be used for a particular stadium
construction. This is similar to what Congress already imposes
on qualified private activity bonds. 2 2 7 I.R.C. § 146 places a cap
on the amount of qualified private activity bonds that can receive
tax-exempt status.2 28 Congress can create a cap especially for
stadium construction bonds, which could limit the federal
government's subsidization to an amount it feels is appropriate.
Congress could make things simpler and classify them as
qualified activity bonds under § 146.229 However, this would
which taxpayers would be able to obtain advance rulings concerning complex tax laws, in
which penalties for non-compliance would be minimized or avoided).
225 See Erickson, supra note 109, at 641 (advocating the elimination of the "entire
private activity analysis").
226 See I.R.C. § 141(a)(1)(B) (2003) (defining private activity bond which meets the
private security or payment test of paragraph two of same section); see also Lathrope,
supra note 37, at 1162-64 (expressing federal tax subsidy for professional sports facilities
should be either repealed or limited); ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 10 (explaining how
the stadium can not finance itself under the current rules).
227 See I.R.C. § 146 (2002) (discussing volume caps which are placed on certain private
activity bonds). See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Excluding the Income of State and Local
Governments: The Need For Congressional Action, 26 GA. L. REV. 421, 478 (1992)
(explaining what prompted Congress to curtail the use of private activity bonds); Patricia
A. Trujillo, Municipal Bond Financing After South Carolina v. Baker and the Tax Reform
Act of 1986: Can State Sovereignty Reemerge?, 42 TAx LAw. 147 (1988) (describing
imposed requirements on municipal obligations in order for bonds to be tax exempt).
228 See I.R.C. § 146(d) (explaining state ceiling on tax exempt private activity bonds as
the greater of $225 million or $75 multiplied by the state population); see also Robinson,
supra note 55, at 140 (speaking of concerns which prompted Congress to impose such
state ceilings on tax exempt private activity bonds); Yamamoto, supra note 38, at 160
(discussing purpose of the volume cap requirement under I.R.C. § 146).
229 See I.R.C. § 146 (listing enumerated qualified activity bonds falling within
exception to volume caps on private activity bond). See generally Bordson, supra note 83,
at 523 (discussing how Congress has not included sports facilities in its list of tax-exempt
facilities in its categorization of publicly funded, tax free private activity bonds);
Yamamoto, supra note 38, at 160 (explaining whether bond is qualified private activity
bond depends on purpose for which its proceeds are used).
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result in some important projects not being funded because the
stadium construction would take its place under the ceiling. 230
To avoid undercutting other programs that receive tax-exempt
bonds under § 146, stadium construction bonds need to be
classified separately.
The most important aspect of this plan would be to place the
cap or ceiling for tax-exempt status of these special stadium
bonds on the team. If the cap of these specific bonds is on the
local or state government, teams could simply shop around from
city to city. 231 In addition to the cap on the franchise, a time
limitation will also apply to the use of tax-exempt bonds. This is
similar to the time limitation placed on the seller of a home
under I.R.C. § 121, limiting the exclusion to once every two
years. 232 This time limit on the franchise should extend for at
least 10-15 years. By placing a time limit on the use of bonds
that will receive tax-exempt interest, a team cannot leave one
city that financed a stadium with tax-exempt bonds after several
years for another community who will also finance a stadium in a
similar fashion. This would not restrict the movement of a
franchise, but would deter it due to the increased cost of a
stadium.233
By establishing these incentives a city also has some leverage
to bargain with a franchise over the terms of a stadium, due to
the fact that the cap and time restriction are on the franchise,
not the government. This levels the playing field and could slow
the franchise relocation problem. 234
230 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 14 (discussing how grouping stadium bonds
with qualified private activity bonds under I.R.C. §146, would cause some needed projects
to go unfunded); see also Bhasin, supra note 41, at 199 (expressing there may be some
validity to view that sports stadium may not be best use of tax dollars that could be used
elsewhere in community); Robinson, supra note 55, at 167 (predicting if bonds for
stadiums were included under volume cap of I.R.C. § 146, bonds for other competing
purposes dealing with public welfare would be "crowded out").
231 See Linda Grant Williams, supra note 59, at 845 (describing franchise movement
as "franchise free agency"); see also Bhasin, supra note 41, at 200 (stating use of tax-
exempt bonds to finance sports stadiums attracts and keeps professional sports in state or
political subdivision's community); Gasper, supra note 30, at 350 (showing how some
franchise owners threaten to relocate if they do not get modern stadiums).
232 See I.R.C. § 121(b)(3) (2002) (applying a 2 year waiting period to the exclusion from
gross income of principle place of residence); see also Donaldson, supra note 223, at 662
(showing how this two year waiting period is applied).
233 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 10.
234 See generally 145 CONG. REC. S4674 (1999) (statement of Sen. Specter) (explaining
franchise relocation problem); see also Michele Cotrupe, Legislative Update: Curbing
Franchise Free Agency: The Professional Sports Franchise Relocation Act of 1998, 9
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:3
A final aspect to this framework is a requirement of private
investment. If a city decides to construct a stadium before the
imposed time limitation has expired, its cost will be significantly
increased due to the higher interest rate on the bonds. 235 To
combat this, Congress should authorize the use of tax-exempt
bonds before the time limitation, conditional on one additional
factor, private contribution. Congress should require 1/3 of the
project to be funded by private sources if the time limitation has
not expired. This will protect a city that decides to undertake a
project before the time limitation has passed. However, the bond
issue will still be subject to the ceiling mentioned earlier.
This sets up a system that allows a certain amount of tax-
exempt bonds to be issued on behalf of a franchise every 10-15
years. If a franchise wants to use the tax-exempt status before
the time window has expired, then it is still available, but the
team must find private capital that will equal 1/3 of the cost.
This creates a disincentive to relocate if a team is close to the
time limit. They can wait and get the advantage of tax-exempt
bonds without having to find a private investor. Overshadowing
this entire system is an overall cap on the amount of tax-exempt
bonds that can be issued for a given stadium construction.
CONCLUSION
In no way does this system completely address the problem of
publicly funded stadiums. Rather, it creates a system of
incentives and disincentives to act a certain way. By creating
this type of flexible system the goal is not to stop publicly funded
stadiums, but rather to slow the process and create limits. In
order for these limits to work, the use of tax-exempt bonds must
be a factor. If a team and city decide to reach an agreement that
doesn't utilize these bonds, then this system will have no effect.
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 165, 172 (1998) (showing how Congress has tried to
remedy problems inherent in sports franchise relocation); Steven R. Hobson II, Preventing
Franchise Flight: Could Cleveland Have Kept the Browns By Exercising Its Eminent
Domain Power?, 29 AKRON L. REV. 665, 667-68 (1996) (discussing congressional
legislation is needed to give stability to professional sports concerning franchise relocation
problem).
235 See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 53, at 10 (stating cost to local and state taxpayers of
professional sports stadiums is reduced by substantial decrease in interest expense made
possible by tax exempt bonds); IBO Report, supra note 63 (noting loss of federal tax
exemption on bonds issued can add up to 34% of total cost of bonds).
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In this regard, there is nothing that federal tax legislation can do
to give a city protection.
It is quite possible that by creating this more complex system
for federal tax-exempt bonds, they will simply not be utilized. If
this is the case, then there is no federal subsidization of these
stadiums. By ending federal subsidization, the cost of stadiums
may increase, but as Senator Moynihan noted, it will not be at
the federal taxpayer's expense. 236 Nothing requires Congress to
offer this federal subsidization. If these rules are not utilized
then the worst-case scenario is that federal subsidization is
stopped. This may not be the optimal solution to the bigger
picture, but Congress has the right to withdraw from the game at
any time.
236 See 142 CONG. REC. S6306 (1996) (opining tax-payers should not "be forced to pay"
for a team's new stadium). See Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, Professional Sports
Franchise Relocations From Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing
Marketplace Competition, League Autonomy, and the Need For a Level Playing Field, 56
MD. L. REV. 57, 145 (1997) (calling federal subsidization of stadium construction an
"unwarranted wealth transfer" from federal tax payers to team owners and players); see
also Musselmann, supra note 38, at 201 (referring to Senator Moynihan's "Stop Tax-
Exempt Arena Debt Issuance Act" of 1997).

